Report of Commission of Inquiry in to Conspiracy to Murder Mahatma Gandhi (1969)

TO$*3ni$

REPORT

*m

OF

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

IN TO

CONSPIRACY TO MURDER
M AH AT MA GANDHI

•LI LIBRARY
347.938(54)(047)IND

■Willi

25649

PART I

VOLUME I

CONTENTS
PART I

Chapter I— Introduction

Chapter II— Facts
Chapter III— Inquiries— Delhi
Chapter IV— Inquiries—Bombay
Chapter V— Scope of the Inquiry
Chapter VI-Background of the Accused

Chapter VH^Jarisiiction of the Commission

Chapter Virr-^Po^ r 3 of a Minister ,^ \** rt ««* • 1

4 minister and Ministerial responsibility

Chapter IX—Panchgani incident
Chapter X— Wardha incident
Chapter XI-Accident to Gandhiji's special train
VOLUME II
Chapter XII— Conditions in Delhi

"S^^ "~ le *"°S «P«> * .ad the'aftcrnu.th

B_ What was happening in Delhi after the bomb was thrown
G— Political conditions in Delhi
D-Statements of officers of the Hone Ministry .
E-The state of the Dalhi Administration

F— Conditions at Birla Hnnw wtu„.

ashramites took Hoase -Wk« precautions the

G-Measures taken to protect Mahatma Gandhi

H— Adequacy of Measures .

I— Causes of Murder of Mahatma Gandhi .
Chapter XIII—Alwa r Affairs
Chapter XIV— Gwalior Affairs

Gandhi

Pages

3-6

7—16
. 17—38
. 39—51
. 53^74

• 75—83

• 85—94
. 95^114
. 115—124
. 125—126

. 127—128

. 131— 231

■ 133—154

■ 154—159
159—166
167—182
182—190

VOLUME III
Chapter XV— Poona
Chapter XVI— Ahmednagar
Chapter XVII-Razaka r Movement

190 — 207

. 207 — 217

. 217—226

226 — 231

233—246

247—250

• 253—312
. 313—352

* 353—354

Vol. I

1—259 HA.

CHAPTER I

Introduction

1.1 This Commission was appointed by notification dated March
22, 1965, S.O. 992. Mr. Gopal Swarup Pathak, M.P., was appointed
to make the Inquiry. On his being appointed a Minister, I was
appointed to conduct the Inquiry on November 21, 1966. The terms
of reference were: —

(a) whether any persons, in particular Shri Gajanan Viswa-
nath Ketkar, of Poona, had prior information of the
conspiracy of Nathuram Vinayak Godse and others to
assassinate Mahatma Gandhi;

(b) whether any of such persons had communicated the said
information to any authorities of the Government of
Bombay or of the Government of India; in particular,
whether the aforesaid Shri Ketkar had conveyed the
said information to the late Bal Gangadhar Kher, the
then Premier of Bombay, through the late Balukaka
Kanetkar;

(c) if so, what action was taken by the Government of
Bombay, in particular by the late Bal Gangadhar Kher,
and the Government of India on the basis of the said in-
formation.

This notification was amended by notification No. 31/28/68-P'oll.I (A)
dated October 28, 1968, making clause (c) to read as follows: —

Xc) if so, what action was taken by the Government of
Bombay, in particular by the late Bal Gangadhar Kher,
and the Government of India and by the officers of the
said Governments on the basis of the said information.

1.2 To assist this Commission, Mr. G. N. Vaidya was engaged by
the Government of Maharashtra and Mr. K. S. Chawla, Barrister-at-
Law was appointed for the Government of India. The Government
of India then replaced their counsel and engaged Mr. B. B. Lall,
Advocate, who appeared before the Commission as from February
10, 1968. Mr. G. N. Vaidya having been raised to the Bench, Mr.
R. B, Kotwal took his place.

1.3 After I was appointed to conduct the Inquiry, notices were
issued under rule 2(1) (a) of the rules under the Commissions of
Inquiry Act (Act LX of 1952) .

1.4 The Commission examined 101 witnesses and 407 documents
were produced by the two Governments and witnesses who appear-
ed before the Commission. The examination of the witnesses took
162 days at various places where the Commission had to sit for the
convenience of the witnesses — Bombay, New Delhi, Dharwar,
Nagpur, Poona, Baroda and Chandigarh.

1.5 As the matter under inquiry was of great importance to the
two Governments, the Commission allowed them full opportunity

SiKnn L7* ? enC fl nd J° cross -^amine witnesses whom the Com-

w£f and t J le Com mission is glad to say that the witnesses

Swf e f , sum f . ned appeared most willingly and without demur

Slw mm and em barrassment if not the discomfort of

Kft Qr TTTT^ n - CoUnsel ar § ued their respective cases
for 50 days out of which Mr. R. B. Kotwal took 37 days and Mr. B. B.

if tan %* Commisslon bought it fit to give full latitude to Counsel

SS,™^? 1 * 6 ?"? . CaseS before the Commission. A list of the
sittings on different dates and the number of witnesses examined
and their names are set out in the appendix I.

frni 6 J?,T Commission is glad to say that it got full co-operation

been JiSl^T! ** T^f ^ CoUnsel but for which " might have
been difficult to make the Inquiry.

1.7 The Report is in six volumes. The evidence recorded bv the
rtn£STi° n ls + contamed in five volumes and the documents pro-
duced before it are contained in another five volumes. Besides this
the record of the proceedings before Judge Atma Charan had also to
be perused as some of the statements were made parts of the evi°
dence before the Commfssion. The case diaries of the Delhi Police
investigation into the bomb case and the murder case and the Crime
Report of the Bombay Police as also some of the files produced by
the Government of India, Director, Intelligence BureaE and v the

record rSl ° f P ° liCe ' ° elhi ' h&Ve been made P arts of the

+u 1-8 ? he . Com mission wishes to thank all those officers who
throughout assisted the Commission in its Inquiry and also those
officers of the Government of India as well as of the Government of

oSred^hv tL ^ h ° hSVe Pr ° dUCed the d ocumentary evidence re"
quired by the Commission or were necessary to subserve the smooth-
working of the Commission. In this matter, the GovernmenT of
Maharashtra has been particularly helpful and they placed all the

3 Ind a wS, Whl< ? W , erS 'I th , dr P osses ^n. The Government
ot India have also placed such documents which were in their

STtfo ft- DiXe i?° r > Intelli S en <* Bureau has also done the
same. But for their willing co-operation it might not have been easy
to conduct this Inquiry or to bring it to a successful end * J

1.9 Commission wishes to thank counsel who have conducted
their respective cases with diligence and ability. But for their
assistance it might not have been possible to unravel the skein of
tangled facts submitted before the Commission.
_ 1.10 The scheme which the Commission has followed is this that*

h^eToutTSLrlS n??^ t0 be . discus - d the CoSmisS
nas set out a narration of facts giving its opinions on Questions of
facts wherever necessary but as the Commission is a^a t-findin-
body an d the conduct of several officers bf Government and hi
action and inactions of Ministers has had to be inquired into and
commented upon, the Commission thought it expedient in fl£
interest of justice to give wherever it was nece SS ary P fre Sum e of Ihe
evidence of each of the important witnesses. This has in many
cases, led to repetition and duplication but because the question of
the respcms, hi, y „r officers and Ministers was involved the Com!

^■IFSZttSr^i have In at r Ld h f T^ ** ° f *™
BOmmented upon but in such cales the Cntt^ "T^ m ° aad

<> refer to all the documentarv anH ntv, miSS -!? n has been careful
been placed before the 7nmS ? ther eviden ce which have
se doc^TL^gSti? CaS f S the authors o?

spiled under their directions It ^nT * hemselves or they were
Persons who are dead W had to h ™ fortun fte that the actions of
Inversely commented upon bu ftha wZ "S ^° ■ and betimes
nature of the inquiry. Dut ^at was inevitable in view of the

'^t^^^t^^J^^^^. in regard to certain
put of India or due to reasom ItT 1 ? 1 , either becaus e ihey are
l^pse of time. CwLS^^S^ S? ^ ™ mo ™* ^ to

insistent with its duty which rt>l Fn ' aS , Xt Was Po^Me" and

Bftding, conunentinTupoIth-lcti^^T had in regard to fact-

Was absolutely unavoidable th? r - SUCh P , erSOns but wherever

make its comments. aV ° ldable the Commission has not hesitated to

indsub^apteL^In ctpterTAt^ ft? d 7 ided into chapters
"ding to the setting up?f this Po^ "* th \ tacts Precedm/and
IV the Commission has discussed fer S 1 Chapters III and
»fter the murder of Mahatma Jandhi U * f",^ In <imrie S ' held
«l 81st January after the wSfrf M^^r^^^ mads
m the Constituent Assembly tK5 FA the interpella-
te explanations given bvZS; i™ 1 ° f f he Mu rder case, and
ter certain adverf e remarkftL ' e f^ 3 of Delhi and Bombay
his judgment andthe^Sntegn^v ft? *<&» Atma Chara » *
'-•eupon. At Bombay also thS^erl stil* 7°™™^ of India
••'"de the interpellation in %Sf r .^.^P™* They in-
quasi inquiry by the Inspector General oTpo^ff^t Asse mbly, a
£ 'lie Bombay Legislative AsSlv i^oio' ^T^' th e debate
" by the Bombay police XTthJJL 9 ' and , the emanation
9»a sco Pe of the present W u ^ In Chapter V

"mussed. Chapter VI deals wifh +£ k , g th e Inquiry have been
"'." Murder case an ChSer^S ^° U - nd . of ^ accused iS
mission. In Chapter VIH S 00^1^2 JUnsdic i tion of the C om .

■ b< •en dealt with. constitutional responsibility of Ministers

g^ffia^S S£?wh?n a t n h d discu r d the ««1

"•ee incidents which harmJZn \Zl ■ n . the murder took place
'■»"; ■'"•e dealt within ChaXs kKV ^ the murder in l«S«Sd"
'•» Mahatma Gandhi at PancLani a5 PJ^l are the alle §ed attack
***** of the Gandhi sB^'S3^SS5JS& «***

■ perSS ^ST sor?^ *S? »* and a «er
JfA (...XII-I. i n chapter^ fxiU and ^^ h ^ ^-chapters

"' I Ksraitor have been discussed the condl «ons at Alwar

^^^&^^m oo^tions prevailing i n the

? Sl^tt ^SSlSS and V w* Bemba. ^
U9 Chapter XXII deals f ^term o^ retoence^^ Mer toa

head fall the investigation = at Mn^ x ^ v ,

divided into three chapters XXIU, «a ,

1110 bindings have been given in Chapter XCTL

li In the toatte, -of W*g££ft elet/ln'ntolS&ld nnder
British Parliament abent th » mjn ahee none y n to , h c mls

said:— ^lSiVtv of the advocate on

"Under our system irt.^ ^oth bSrister and soli-
each side— I use that ternrto coy brought before
citor-to seethat ^ *f .«j^„th adversary system

the judge. ^-^noufsitoSl When, for example, a gov-
as opposed tothe nqmsitoriaL w s ^ t ^ th

SST^SSU s IX? ^J^fKJSnS

fdvSaries, and ti^j^S^ 'TSd? Under the
with powers to ^certain the^±a cte ^ g . de d

ftfe-S^atl^^^ P— that way .
than if he does the job himself.
,n judging t-estote ^in^*, — SS^ *

^ S^e «ion bas be« subieejed to ejitielsto — |
complimentary and sometimes adverse uiose ^^ ^

jSial office may be imperviouS e tog* maj ^ mind ^

criticisms; but such criticisms are ^^^ such crit i c ism S cannot be

^S^fS^X^ there may be some

tional difficulty about it. Governor

U, The C T rn^^sn^^^J^ *»^ he h£?

General, Earl Mountbatten because ne witnesses fr0 m which

iS^^^rr^&S regard to nralters

CHAPTER II— FACTS
Indere of Paragraphs

2.2 - Jinnah's suggested exchange of population

2.3 ' Mountbatten plan

2.4 Direct Action Day and consequences thereof

2.6 Refusal to pay cash balances

2.7 Maulana's complaint

2.8 Pressure on Mahatma for getting moneys paid

2.9 Mahatma's fast

2.14 Conspiracy at Poona

2.15 & 19 Bomb explosion

2.16 Movements of conspirators

2.21 Investigation at Bombay and Delhi

2.30 Murder of Mahatma Gandhi

2.34 Bombay Inquiry

CHAPTER II
Facts

2.1 Facts which have preceded and given rise to this reference are
:these:

2 2 On December 10, 1945 Mr. Jinnah first suggested the possibility
of the exchange of population "if it could be done purely on a volun-
tary basis" which the Hindus and Sikhs and other non-Mushms of
the PunSb North West Frontier Province, Sindh and Bengal re-
nted most vehemently. On November 24, 1946 Mr. Jinnah at a
P e rel conference at Karachi said that the question of e-ha^h°_uld
L taken ud immediately to which the reaction of non-Muslims
thro?ghout P India was most unfavourable though it was supported
ay thf Muslim League but in the Punjab only one League leader
supported it e.g. the Nawab of Mamdot.

2 3 On 2nd June 1947 Lord Mountbatten announced a three-fold
plan for solution of the Indian problem, one of which was the parti-
tion of the country-Pakistan to have Muslim majority areas of the
Punjab Sindh, Baluchistan and Bengal. There was to be a plebiscite
SN.W.FP. but that also went in favour of Pakistan. A fortiori the
rest of territories of the country were to form India.

24 In pursuance of their demand for Pakistan the Muslirn League
in about March 1947 observed what was the Direct Action Day the
Snsequlnce of which was that Hindus, and Sikhs in 4b wester* .dis-
tricts of the Punjab particularly in rural areas were subjected to
indescribable atrocities which in one of the northern districts of the
ptn%Twas termed the 'Rape of Rawalpindi'. Consequent upon this
and particularly after the announcement of the Partition plan the
Hindus and Sikhs of the western districts of Western Punjab started
leaving their hearths and homes and migrated into eastern districts
of the°Puniab, Delhi and into western U.P. which inter alia created
a law and ord;r problem in those parte There had beenin 1«» what
were euphemistically called Hindu-Muslim riots m Noakha i and
Tipperah districts of East Bengal which had resulted in forcible con-
versions, murder, rape, abduction, etc., of which the victims were
solely Hindus. Mahatma Gandhi thereupon with a party of his
ashramites went on a peace mission to Chaumuhani m Noakhali dis-
trict on November 7, 1946 and remained m that district till March 3
1947 After leaving Noakhali the Mahatma came to Bihar and Irom
there came back to Calcutta and after visiting Kashmir and again
visiting Patna and Calcutta returned to New Delhi on September 9,
1947 and stayed at Birla House instead of at Bhangi Colony.

2 5 From Noakhali he came to Patna via Sodepur near Calcutta.
He returned to Delhi but went back to Patna and returned to Delhi
on May 25 1947. From there he went to Srinagar and Jammu and

10

Wah and again went to Calcutta on August 7, 1947. He finally re-
turned to Delhi on September 9, 1947, after having stayed in a Muslim
locality in Calcutta (Beliaghata) and when he arrived in Delhi he
was shocked to hear about the riots in the capital — see 'Mahatma
Gandhi' by Tendulkar, Vol. VIII, page 134.

2.6 Sometimes in the end of December, 1947 the Government of
India decided to postpone the payment of 55 crores ' Pakistan's share
of cash balances. It was a freeze and the payment was to await an
overall settlement.

2.7 On January 4, 1948 the Delhi Maulanas complained to
Mahatma Gandhi about their safety putting moral pressure upon
him, which from all accounts greatly disturbed the Mahatma.

2.8 According to some witnesses Lord Mountbatten also was
putting moral pressure on the Mahatma in regard to the payment of
55 crores, the non-payment of which, according to him, would have
tarnished the fair name and honour of India. Pyarelal in his book
at page 700 has given a slightly different version and has called it
invited advice. He also impressed upon Mahatma Gandhi the
necessity of exerting his influence to prevent the exodus of Muslims
from Delhi to Pakistan. The Commission has not examined Lord
Mountbatten and it expresses no opinion on the correctness or other-
wise of statement regarding moral pressure.

2.9 On January 13, 1948 at 11.55 a.m. the Mahatma undertook
a fast with two objectives (i) to undo the decision regarding the
payment of the cash balances to Pakistan, and (ii) to produce an
atmosphere of' proper Hindu-Muslim amity in Delhi. A fuller
account of this will be given later. On January 15, 1948, i.e., on the
third day of the fast the Government of India announced that it had
decided to pay the 55 crores cash balances to Pakistan immediately.
This greatly incensed militant sections of the Hindus, particularly
the Hindu Mahasabha. The Mahatma in his post-prayer speeches
had been insisting that the Muslims should not be disturbed from
their habitations and that the Hindu refugees who had come should
not indulge in violence so as to create a situation which would force
the Muslims to leave their homes.

2.10 During Mahatma's fast there were processions taken to Birla
House to protest against Mahatma's fasting in order to coerce Gov-
ernment of India to pay 55 crores and to prevent the rehabilitation .
of Hindu refugees into houses left vacant by the Muslims who had
taken refuge in Purana Quila, Humayun's Tomb, etc. Some of the
refugees were so incensed that they took out processions and slogans
were shouted 'MARTA HAI TO MARNE DO' (If Gandhi wants to
die, let him die). However, as a result of the fast an atmosphere
was created which according to Pyarelal's book* softened the hearts
of a large section of the Hindus and the leaders of the Hindus and
the Muslims agreed to sign a four-point pledge to keep peace and
harmony.

•Malnifrnn (Jn.Ml.i tin- I i | [*h m < .Vol I!

11

2.11 On the morning of January 18, 1948 the Peace Committee
which had been formed after the Mahatma's undertaking the fast gave
a pledge assuring Ga'ndhiji (i) that the annual fair at Khawaja
Qutabuddin's Mausoleum at Mehrauli will be held as usual, (ii)
Muslims will be able to move about in Delhi, (iii) Mosques left by
the Muslims and taken possession of by Hindus and Sikhs will be
vacated, Muslim areas will not be forcibly occupied, and (iv) the
Hindus will not object to the return of Muslims who had migrated,.
whereupon tH? Mahatma gave up his fast taking orange juice from
the hands of Maulana Azad at 12.45 p.m.

2.12 On January, 1948 a meeting under the auspices of the Hindu
Mahasabha was held in which they expressed indignation over the
payment of 55 crores, described Mahatma's fast as being helpful to
Pakistan, a boost to the value of property of Muslims in Delhi and
it was ridiculing the Hindus and Sikhs all the world over. Some
derogatory remarks were made against Mahatma Gandhi calling him
a dictator who would soon meet the fate of Hitler. On the 19th
January 1948 the Secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha Mr. Ashutosh
Lahiri issued a pamphlet Ex. P-25 in which he repudiated the Hindus
being any party to the four-point pledge and repudiated those Hindus
who were parties to it. -

2.13 Police reports show that the Sikhs were also unhappy about
the fast which was for the protection of Muslim rights and did not
do anything for the Hindus and Sikhs. Police reports also show that
the Mohammedans passed resolutions at two meetings on the 19th
and 23rd January 1948 recognizing the selfless services of Mahatma
Gandhi.

2.14 We might go back a few days; a conspiracy was formed in
Poona, Bombay etc. to murder Mahatma Gandhi in which some
Maharashtrians and one Punjabi, Madanlal by name, were the parti-
cipants. Gopal Godse's evidence discloses that the conspirators were
many more though he does not say so in so many words. In pur-
suance of the objects of the conspiracy the conspirators came to Delhi
by air and rail between the 17th and 19th January and took up
residence at hotels and the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan. On the 18th
January 1948 some of the conspirators attended Mahatmajf s prayer
meeting at Birla House at 5 p.m. That was to reconnoitre the place
and the crowds. On the morning of 19th January 1948 some of them
got accommodation at the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan. The Police
case was that this they got by getting a chit from Nathuram Godse
in the name of his friend the Secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha
Bhawan, but this fact was not established. On 19th morning the
conspirators met in the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan and in the after-
noon chalked out a programme to kill Mahatma Gandhi. On the 19th
January 1948 three of the conspirators Godse, Karkare and Apte went
to the Birla House, took note of the Police arrangements there and
surveyed the prayer ground. At 4 p.m. the same day i.e. :>9th
January 1948 they again came to the prayer ground at 10 p.m. five
Of them met at the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan and held confabula-
tions.

U5 On January 20. 1948 Nathuram Godse was ill and tour of
them again went to the Birla House to survey the place They
.returned to the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan at 10.30 a.m. Somewhere
at about mid-day tested their revolvers in the jungle behind Hindu
Mahasabha Bhawan. In the afternoon they met at Marina Hotel
and chalked out their final plan of action,

k ?' 16 n^f' 4 ? *?* they Came t0 the Birla - House an d there on the
.back wall Madanlal ignited a gun-cotton slab which has been called a
bomb Madanlal was arrested at the spot and on search of his person
a nandgrenade was recovered amongst other things. Three of them
who were with Madanlal escaped in the taxi in which they had come
and returned to Connaught Place. Three others who were in the
.prayer meeting itself also escaped after mixing with the crowd At
this stage their names and details of escape are not necessary Their
movements! will be given in detail later.

2.17 The two principal conspirators N. V. Godse and Apte left

the same evening by train from Delhi main station and returned to

.Bombay .ma Kanpur and Allahabad on the evening of 23rd January

■wnf 2 *! 18 ^ e i h l rd S° pal Godse stayed the ni S ht at th e Frontier Hindu
oi and left for Bombay the next morning by the Frontier Mail i p
on 21st January 1948. The fourth Karkare g stayed in DeM So he
afternoon of the 23rd and left Delhi on the 23rd January 1948 and
by taking short distance trains and bus journeys and by breaking
%£? ™ F en r0ute reached Kalyan on the morning of 26th Januarf
1948. The remaining two Badge and Shankar took the Bomba?
Express from Delhi Main Railway Station on the 20th January 1948

Zfrf\ K fl RU °V he 22nd m0rnin ^ and then Prooeeded to Poona
and reached there the same day. In this manner all the conspirators
♦escaped from Delhi unnoticed and untraced and weS SS 5
Bombay as shown above.

2.19 On January 20, the bomb was thrown and on the 21st January
morning newspapers came out with news about the bomb incident

Delhi, &X 106-A, The Bombay Chronicle of Bombay, Ex. 107 came out
witn prominent banner lines but The Hindustan Times, Ex 106-B

'^M^cJn^S^ 06 an ^ : apt ^ 0n f ° Ut Kashmir-AGREED
M ukmula ON KASHMIR— and then in column Nos. 4 and 5 another

SffiS^ W ly f 0mi Tt r G P DffIJ I EAGER TO GO TO

smlS^ ^e\Ls "Rl'b r n ° * JUSt gaW the Captlon in comparatively

SrtRS'^ UP . near Prayer 1 g rounds " ^ then instill
small letters Gandhiji did not even turn his head".

2.20 The Times of India gave an account of what its Soecial
Representative learnt in regard to the incident The Statesman

3 %ff l°f the A st ^. tha T t there Was a formidable ploton^me
of the Mahatma. A Police Inspector said, "The bomb was intended
to create confusion even though it was powerful enough to toll many

SnatSVtr 8 aPParentl I t0 b --ed%5LrtS
Manatma nmiseli . The story given in the Bombay Chronicle of

\n

Bombay was that the person who threw the bomb confessed that he-
hid done so because he did not like the peace campaign of Mahatma
Gandhi.

2.21 Two sets of investigations, independent of each other, were-
started— one at Delhi under Ch. X1IV of Cr.P.C. and the other at
Bombay. It is a matter of controversy under what law the latter*
was undertaken and whether it was an investigation at all. But-
without here deciding the question the Commission will call it an
investigation as did Mr. Nagarvala himself in his letter Ex. 8. Trie-
course of Delhi investigation was as follows.

2.22 The First Information Report under sections 4 and 5 of
Explosive Substances Act was lodged by Mr. K. N. Sahney, Magis-
trate, 1st Class, Karnal, wit. 25 which was recorded at the Tughlaq
Road Police Station at 6-30 p-m. and the investigation started there-
after by the S.H.O. Sub-Inspector Dasondha Singh, wit. 14.

2.23 Before the First Information Report was actually recorded.
Madanlal was searched and a handgrenade was found on him show-
ing his real intention as anything but innocent. He was questioned.
at the Birla House and was then taken to the Parliament Street Police-
Station where some high ranking police officers interrogated him and
he is alleged to have made a statement, Ex. 6, which has given rise-
to a sharp controversy. But this much is uncontroversial that he
gave the name of Karkare and also disclosed where he and his com-
panions had stayed- The two places mentioned by him, i.e., Marina
Hotel and the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan were raided and in the*
formei it was discovered that two of the conspirators stayed under
assumed names of 'S' and 'M' Deshpande and they had hurriedly
left. In the room where they stayed a document Ex. P-25 was found,.
showing their close connection with the Hindu Mahasabha which is
noted in paragraph 17 of the first case diary.

2.24 On the 21st January a remand of 15 days was obtained,
Madanlal was taken to the Civil Lines Police Station where he was:
interrogated and this interrogation continued upto the 24th January
when he made a fuller statement, Ex. 1, wherein he mentioned the-
proprietor of the 'Hindu Rashtriya" paper as a co-conspirator but
did not mention the "Agrani" or the editor.

2.25 On further enquiry it was discovered that the number of the
taxi by which the culprits had arrived at Birla House and which was ;
noted down by the witnesses was a wrong number as that was the
number of a G.N.I.T. bus.

2.26 On the same day two police officers were flown to Bombay
but the case diary No. 2 A of their departure does not show what
documents, if any, were taken by them and what exactly they were
required to do in Bombay and there was no mention of a requisition
required under section 54 (Ninthly) Cr.PC.

14

2.27 On 23rd January, Kali Ram, a bearer of the Marina Hotel
produced some clothes three of which had the marking 'N.V.G.' but
it does not appear that either the Delhi Police or the Bombay Police
.made any use of this discovery. There is no evidence that it was
ever conveyed to Bombay Police.

2.28 Interrogation continued on the following day and with the
permission of the District Magistrate, one Mehta Puran Chand,
Advocate, interviewed Madanlal while his interrogation was going
on which naturally had to be interrupted. A copy of the full state-
ment of Madanlal was given to Mr. U. H. Rana, D.I.G., C J.D., Bombay
on January 25, 1948, and he proceeded to Bombay the same night

-via Allahabad because flying did not suit him but surely he did not
need to go via the Triveni, unless no accommodation in the direct
train could be arranged for him. Meanwhile on the 24th the Delhi
policemen who had gone to Bombay returned and on 25th they made
a complaint of the treatment or mistreatment that they had received
at the hands of Mr. Nagarvala and of the Bombay Police.

2.29 It is stated that special policemen were posted at important
places in order to trace the culprits. The interrogation of Madanlal
continusd but nothing useful was discovered. On the 29th January
1948 the police discovered the taxi used for the commission of the
offence and also who its driver was.

2.30 On 30th January, 1948, while the Mahatma was proceeding
ix> the prayer meeting and had: just stepped on to the prayer ground,
he was shot at by Nathuram Godse who was arrested there and then
and his name given then was 'Narayan Vinayak Godse'. The diary
shows that he was the accomplice in the Bomb Case who was describ-
ed by Madanlal as the editor of the "Rashtriya" newspaper Poona.

.A photograph of the assassin's pistol is attached herewith. (See next
page).

2.31 The other culprits who had accompanied Nathuram Godse
escaped from Delhi and subsequent investigation was carried on in
Bombay under the direction of Mr. U. H. Rana by Mr. J.'D. Nagarvala
;as the Special Additional Superintendent of Police, Delhi.

2.32 It is not necessary at this stage to trace the movements of the
conspirators who escaped after the bomb was thrown. Godse and
Apte the two principal conspirators had escaped to Bombay reaching
there on the 23rd,* They went via Kanpur and Allahabad. They
flew back to Delhi on January 27, 1943 under assumed names and
then took a train to Gwalior where they stayed for the night at Dr.
Parchure's house. The next day they purchased a pistol from one
Goel and returned to Delhi on the morning of the 29th and stayed,
at the Delhi Main Railway Station in a retiring room where they
were met by Karkare. On the 30th they first practised in a jungle
behind Birln Mnndir "pistol shooting", reconnoitred the Birla. House
which they had as s matter of fact done the previous day also and
Nathuram ( rodso committed Mir <>nvurc on iii<> ::oiii ,-a n.oo p.m. after
he h> i i lid M . ol al th • i itutes ot I Ihlvaji Maharaja and

Bfljil ir) IV ihi I

c\j
6

o
■+-*

•a

■B

O

o
o

t

a

o

CS1

W

15

2.33 Nathuram Godse was arrested at the spot as above stated but
Apte and Karkare again escaped from Delhi and went back to
Bombay where they were arrested on 14th February 1948 under
circumstances which would indeed be romantic had the matter been
not so tragic.

Bombay Inquiry

2.34 The scene now shifts to Bombay where on an information
given by Prof. 3*™x investigation was carried on between 21st
January and 30th January. This is an unfortunate chapter of oppor-
tunities missed, errors committed and of assuming exaggerated
notions about oneself. After the explosion of the bomb Prof. J. C.
Jain of the Ruia College got a little unnerved because Madanlal had
disclosed to him before going to Delhi that he and his companions
were going to murder Mahatma Gandhi which he had considered to
be a mere boast though in fact he did not take the matter so light-
ly. But he was hesitant, dithering and failed to give this informa-
tion to any authority.

2.35 On the 21st he met the Premier and the Borne Minister of
Bombay and made them the recipients of this vital information with
a request to Mr. Morarji Desai not to disclose his name to anyone.
Mr. Morarji Desai in his turn called the D.eputy Commissioner of
Police Mr. Nagarvala, but as he could not come at once he asked
him to come to the Central Station of the B.B. & C .1. Railway from
where he was leaving for Ahmedabad to give this vital information
to Sardar Patel. Mr. Morarji Desai conveyed to Nagarvala the
information that he had received and directed him to arrest Karkare
and his associates and to watch the house of Savarkar because both
these persons were mentioned by Prof. Jain to him.

2.36 Nagarvala promptly got into touch with his contacts and his
informers, instructing them to locate Karkare and his associates.
l te learnt from Ahmsdnagar that Karkare was not there.

2.37 It is not necessary at this stage to give a resume of what Mr.
Nagarvala did or what steps he took. But briefly stated, he learnt
that one Balraj Mehta and Av*tar Singh of the Sher-i-Punjab Hotel

•wore in the conspiracy. Information from Ahmednagar was that
Badge of Poona, a dealer in illicit arms, was a close associate of
Karkare; and his contacts informed him that Savarkar was the real
instigator of the conspiracy and his illness was feigned. Savarkar's
house was kept under watch. Nagarvala's informants also told him
that there were many other conspirators, about 20 Punjabis and
(Vhharashtrians, with a large following, Efforts were made to find
out the haunts of those persons. From 22nd onwards the police tried
to find out the whereabouts of Karkare and Badge, particularly in
Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan at Parel. Watch was kept on the Arya
Pathik Ashram where two suspicious looking Punjabis were staying.
They were suspected to be associates of Balraj Mehta.

2.315 Mr, Rana the D.T.G. (C.I.D) arrived in Bombay on the 27th
iiinl stayed with I VI r NNij^irvnln who told him <>f t!ir steps he had

16

taken upto then and both of them had a long distance talk with Mr.
banjevi the DJl.B and then gave him full details of what had been

M l ben { Rana H d taken with him the statement oflS
al winch he showed to Nagarvala who read one or two pages but

K™\ n baC V r ° m o him Say ,! ng " Was t0 ° lon § and Promised to send
him a copy from Poona which he never did.

Mofl 39 Aft ^ j he , murder wh en Nagarvala learnt the name of
Nathuram Godse, he arrested the various suspects and interrogated

had a Sen S ^ CIet fl f/^ 6 and Ms Bod yg^rd Kasar. LiSye wha
murderer AntfS, ?£ the P olice £* if Nathuram Godse was the.

SSfeST* ave been Wlth him and tbatthey must have

2.40 The murder of Mahatma Gandhi, who was acknowledged to<
be the Father of the Nation and who had not only preached but
practised non-violence for four decades and who had led India to
independence, produced anguish and even consternation not only
amongst the leaders of public opinion and the Government of the-
day, but also amongst the millions who constituted the newly emerg-
ed independent Indian nation.

2.41 Everyone was anxious to know how the apostle of peace and
non-violence could meet such a tragic end. And, therefore what one-
may conveniently call inquiries were started both in Delhi and in
Bombay which were the two places principally concerned with the
tragic events culminating in the murder of the Mahatma.

*i, 2 o1 2 . T ? Delhi there were four inquiries: (1) an informal one on>
the 31st January, 1948, (2) interpellation in the Constituent Assembly
on February 6, 1948, (3) trial of the accused in the Court of Judge
Atma Charan, Special Judge, and (4) explanation called from the-
police officers who had been in charge of Mahatma Gandhi's protec-
tive measures and of the investigation after the bomb wa s exploded.

2.43 In Bombay similarly there were what may, for the want of
a better word, be called inquiries. Including the court case which
™ a L ™ e , ' th . re were five inquiries in Bombay: (1) interpellation:
in the Bombay Legislative Assembly; (2) explanation called by Mr.
Kamte Inspector General of Police, from Mr. U. H. Rana, Deputy
Inspector General of Police and his explanation; (3) the trial in the,
Court at Delhi of Judge Atma Charan; (4) Cut Motion in the Bombay
Legislative Assembly in March 1949; and (5) the explanation of Mr.
J . D. Nagarvala, Daputy Commissioner of Police and what followed
thereupon. These will be briefly dealt with in the following
cnapters.

CHAPTER III— INQUIRIES— DELHI

Index of Paragraphs

3.1 Meeting at Sardar Patel's house on 31-1-1943—

1st Innniry

3.20 Interpellations in the Constituent Assembly

3.26 Third Inquiry I

3.28 Fourth Inquiry

3.31 Ex. 7, note of Mr. Sanjevi as explanation

3.42 Mr. Rana summoned by Mr. Sanjevi, Ex. 7 contd.

3.49 Ex. 7 contd. Ex. 9 attached

3.51 Note, Ex. 7, summed up

3.53 Mr. Iengar's remarks /

3.54 Letters of Mr. Nagarvala, Exs. 8 and 9.

IV

CHAPTER III
Inquiries — Delhi

First Inquiry

3.1 The shock of Mahatma's murder and the fact that it could be

committed openly in the prayer grounds in spite of the precautions

■ ikon led to an inquiry at the earliest opportunity as to where the

' i tigs went wrong. This was by way of an informal meeting where

Hi'' matter was discussed.

/ ■AIv ° b ^ ect ° f this meetin & according to Mr. R. N. Banner jee
(wit. 19), was to devise measures to protect the living ie the
Ministers and other high dignitaries. It also appears that the
im'otmg reviewed the circumstances which led to the assassination
D Orandhiji despite previous warnings and the facts disclosed by
M.idanlal's statement.

3.3 After the funeral, a meeting was called at a very short notice
', ;,« * se of the Home Minister in the evening of 31st January,
948. According to Mr. Bannerjee's statement before Mr. Pathak as
ltness No. 17, the following were present: Prime Minister Nehru
Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel, Mr. B. G. Kher, Premier of
Mombay, Mr. Rajagopalachari, Governor of West Bengal and Mr
B innerjee and Mr. Sanjevi, Mr., D. W. Mehra's note Ex. 10-A dated
February 1, 1948, besides these names, gave the names of Raikumari
Amnt Kaur, Mr. Morarji Desai, the Chief Commissioner and him-
Mi'll. A copy of this note is Ex. 10-A produced by Mr. D. W Mehra
before this Commission.

3.4 The confessional statement of Madanlal was read by Mr

■ I injevi, who also said that he had sent a copy of that statement

"• ,™ ? Ce officers ' who wejre Sown to Bombay on 21st Janu-

1948, but the two police officers returned after two or three

»nd complained that the Bombay police did not take any

BOtlce of them and had asked them to return to Delhi and that they

•Uld themselves look into the matter. The confessional statement

»l Madanlal was then read which disclosed a conspiracy to murder

M.ihatma Gandhi which had been in existence for some time In

II"- statement, Madanlal had given names and particulars of the

mnspirators, two or three haunts in Bombay which were men-

, "'; t£J85&yU&$ s „ of inspirators and Madanlal told the

|».l«ce, "PHIR AYEGA". From this Mr. Bannerjee understood that
mnspirators would return to Delhi to kill Mahatma Gandbi At
!■■<• 'Iiscussion it came out that Godse had reconnoitred the prayer
»OUnd at Birla House on the evening of the 29th, ie., a day before
II"- murder. It also came out at the meeting that Mr. Sanjovi gave

19

20

no information to either the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi or to Mr-
Bannerjee. Mr. Bannerjee said: —

"I will put it to gross incompetency and lethargy on the part
of Mr. Sanjevi that he did not care to inform either me or to-
remind the Bombay police as to what action they had been
taking/'

Mr. Sanjevi said at that meeting that he had not reminded the
Bombay police after the return of the Delhi police officers sent by
him. This emerged in the course of the meeting. Everyone present
was m great anguish and Mr. Sanjevi admitted that he had not re-
minded the Bombay police.

3.5 Mr. Bannerjee was recalled before this Commission. He
added that besides the gentlemen he had named before, Mr. Shan-
karrao Deo was also present at that meeting. The account that he
gave at this hearing was that the confessional statement of Madan-
lal which had been recorded earlier was read out. He said; —

"This was the first intimation that we from Pandit Nehru
downward got that there was a confessional statement and
certain information was contained in it which if properly
utilised would have resulted in the arrest of those persons
who were participants in the murder of Mahatma Gandhi.
In the statement, the particulars and the haunts of some of
the persons who were subsequently accused and convicted of
murder were given. If the police had been vigilant, it should
have been possible for them to have arrested those persons. 5 '

3.6 Mr. Bannerjee added: —

"None of us knew about the particulars of this conspiracy. Mr.
Sanjevi never gave us any information about it. When he was
asked why he had not done s o, he just said, 'he was sorry he
just did not do it'. I put this due to the incompetency and
lethargy of Mr. Sanjevi not to have informed or to have
ordered the Bombay police to send their men here or to have
reminded the Bombay police in regard to the information
which was sent to them."

3.7 Mr. Bannerjee was asked by the Commission as to whether
Ex. 6 or Ex. 36 the first alleged statement of Madanlal was read out
or some other statement. His reply was that he could not recollect
what was read out but what was read out gave more particulars
about Bombay haunts and about THIS AYEGA'. Commission then
showed him Ex. 5, the original of which is Ex. 5-A, and he was
asked if that statement was ever shown to him. He replied: —

"We never saw any papers. Some papers were in the hands of
Mr. Sanjevi and he read out extracts therefrom."
He added that he understood from Mr. Sanjevi's statement that full
confessional statement of Madanlal was sent to Bombay, the subs-
tance <>r whirh was that Apte and Godse must have gone back to
<> n,> <> r th*ir hMlitl In Bombay. But no such statement has been pro-
duced hrforv Uh* < \muni:;:;ion.

21

W fc 3 ' 8 l£ cross - ex t mi T na , tio n by Mr. Vaidya, Mr. Bannerjee said that
when they came back from the cremation of Mahatma Gandhi a
meeting was called at a very short notice where everybody was in a
mournful mood, and "the Sardar asked Sanjevi what had happened

TW? Cam f- ° Ut W / th ^ e m m%m that the names had been S to
Bombay police and nothing wa s done there. It was that part which

S^ffif 1 5 b7 ^ ? anje ^ ? ^ ' Mr ' Bann ^jee added tnlt

tt 5tf tw f gre ^ an f r h ^ d so were " we au but i toid

bardar Patel that he could not have done anything more than to ask
his police to be vigilant- Further, he said:-

"I feel it very difficult to be able to reconcile this statement of
the Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., with the scene I recall
of the meeting of the 31st January, 1948, at which everybody
was m extreme anguish and was surprised to hear that there
was a conspiracy and the names of the conspirators were dis-
closed m the statement of Madanlal."

Mr. Bannerjee again repeated that the words "PHIR AYFOA"
were mentioned at the meeting on the 31st January by Mr Sanievi'
He thought it was Mr. Sanjevi but he could not WeSkl^ho
said these words. Those words did come at the meeting but he ccSd
not say for certain by whom they were said. He thenlddecf that he
might have heard these words later after the meeting.

mJ; 9 ^' B 5 mnerje .l als ? said that after the 3 0th January Govern-
ment felt rather guilty about not. having taken preventive or pu™-
tzve action against the R.S.S., although in Ite^MnS^^Sn
those who conspired to murder Mahatma Gandhi did not do so as
members of the RS.S. "An informal decision a fU ^ postfunera
meeting was hat the R.S.S. should be banned in^MS 15
secre instructions should issue to Provincial Governments the same
m K ^ ut /° meh0W ° r the other the news of S?ffl^t
-and the leaders of the movement went underground ^ \fr Banne?
ee categorically stated that at that meeting lobody from top to
the bottom knew that a statement had been made by EanS £
what the contents of the statement were. J Maaanlal or

3.10 There is some documentary evidence to show aq t« ?*kl'i +u Q
meeting was held *nd what was stated by m^^h^t S§
the dates do not accord. There is a difference of a cSy '

3.11 In his letter, Ex. 7-A, dated February 20, 1949 to Mr H V Tt

His Excellency the Governor-General (then Governor ofWe^
Bengal) , the Premiers of U.P. and Bombay and Mr ShanhS
rao Deo were also present." onanxar-

w'"' "l"! '^V.r'"/" 1 •r 1 '" &* acconvp.nnyin,. Nol,. 10k •/ H winch

i: t u^'ml ' " ,v,; "'^ r ■ 'I*™*

22

o-7o 3 ' 12 Accordin S to the personal diary of Miss Maniben Patel, Ex..
I h on ere was a meetin g af ter the cremation on 31st January 194ft
at 7-30 p.m. Those present were Rajaji, Pantji, Balasahib Kher,.
Mehra, Bannerjee, Shankarrao Deo, Shankar and Mr. Jairamdas
Daulatram. Balasahib Kher talked on the phone to Mr. Morarii
Desai at Bombay and Raja Maharaj Singh also talked from Bombay
to Mr. Nehru on the phone.

3.13 In the note Ex. 7-B in paragraphs 2 and 3 are given the steps
taken m regard to augmenting the police personnel. Besides the
uniformed police, one Sub-Inspector, four Head Constables, and two
Constables m plain clothes, armed with revolvers were deputed for
the personal security of the Mahatma. Three were stationed on the
pathway which led to the prayer meeting and their duty was to spot
possible offenders. Uniformed police at the gate had instructions to
stop ail persons about whom they had any doubt.

3.14 The police officers on duty were given the descriptions of
the men who were with Madanlal when the bomb had exploded and;
they were told to keep a sharp lookout for them. There is how-
ever, no evidence of these officers having been of any utility what-
soever or to have done anything to prevent Godse and others like
him getting near Gandhiji.

• + 3 '^ A £. account of this meeting is also given by Mr. M. K Sinha
ml' ft ^ s , ste - te ment is mere hearsay because he was not present."
What he stated was that after the funeral, there was a meeting at
the Home Minister's house and among those present were the Prime
Minister, the Chief Minister of U.P. and several others including Mr
R. N. Bannerjee. Mr. Sinha said, "I was also told that Madanlal's
confessional statement was read by Pantji and he asked Sanjevi a*

™7 T, IS? J 10 *! a , rrest °/ a P an & e to get these persons who were
named by Madanlal arrested". His reply was that no names had
been mentioned in the statement but Pantji told him that descriptions
and some addresses were mentioned and he could easily have had!
them arrested only if he had taken the trouble to do so.

3.16 Even though the Evidence Act does not strictly apply to pro-
T^lf, het °l e th % Com ™ssion, yet the Commission does not think
it right to take into account this hearsay evidence even though it
may be corroborative in nature. tnou & n it.

3.17_So this was the first inquiry, an informal one no doubt, where
Sanjevi was asked as to what had happened. He produced a confes-
sional statement of Madanlal which, according to Mr. Banneriee
contained the names and haunts of some of the accused According
to Miss Maniben Patel, wit. 79, Sanjevi had said that hehad./nt f

wT7 VX tU ?\ St ? eme ^ ma / e b y Madanlal tS suttance a of which
7?T+T,i2 that ^ Pte an ^ God ?e must have gone back to Bombay,
(2) there were two or three hanuts at Bombay. That is what Mr
Bannerjee has also stated. Thus, it appears from th£ eviSce that
the question of eonspiraey was first disclosed at this S
Sanjcv, road out Irom the eon fessional statement of Madnnhd but
What Or Which thai ,„„!,:;: ,| .l.lnn,,! w;l; ; , ;; ,,,,,' ,™

23

™^t ^\rl de ^rP T °t UCed before this Commission. No state-
SwSSiK 6611 produced before the Commission which
comprises all that Mr. Bannerjee says was said at the meeting.

mri 1 ^^' D ' + W- ^ m haS P roduced before the Commission a
S tv, v n f Which was P re P ared by him and was presented
before the high-powered meeting, Ex. 10-A. It is a copy of Ex. 10
wth the note of Mr. Sanjevi Ex.7. It sets out the increase in the
number and deployment of police at the Birla House after the Bomb
incident It mentions that screening of visitors was suggested by
Superintendent Bhau'a to Mr. Brij Krishan Chandiwala which he
would not agree to and then a similar suggestion by Mr. Mehra him-
self to Gandhiji was also rejected. It then gives an account of the

Xadanla? ™n rreSt SL N T athuram Gods e ** **> what statement
Madanlal made on 20th January, wherein he gave only one name
and there is no mention of the editor of the 'Agrani'.

nrpin 9 +' A a ?+^ St W ? at ma y- be termed non-officials who were
present at this meeting were Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, Mr. Jairamdas
Daulatram, and Mr. Shankarrao Deo, who fortunately are ahJebut
2StW I 6 ? mmisslon to Set them to appear before it proved
fruitless because for one reason or another they did not appear and
they pleaded complete forgetfulness about the incident Thus
very valuable evidence about what explanations were given by" Mr'
Sanjevi remained unavailable to the Commission. But Commission'
well understands the position of these eminent citizens of India?
Itt,n U tL^f a e -i and , laP if e + + f °r*,*»o decades, might well have for^
Son took place at that very sad and unhappy

Second Inquiry |

3.20 The Members of the Constituent Assembly took the earliest

2 P ?WriS,, Int f Pdla ^ ^ H ° me Minister to elici * iSormaS
?,„?> circumstances leading to the assassination of Mahatma

£ St ' a W 1C + i 1S Sh ° Wn by . Ex - 142 dated February 6, 1948. In reply
to Mr. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, Sardar Patel gave details 2

Ze P ln^ n kl a ^r,V^ h r h inddent and\Is G o whatwas
u ne alter it. He gave the details of increase in the strength of the

Police stationed at Birla House and also the number of plain clothes
.ohcemen deployed there and the instructions given to the Po ice

i?^ ' V aid ' considered that they should be allowed to"

search every stranger attending the prayer meetings but To this

Candhiji did not agree. Sardar Patel stated that he had himseS
•leaded with Gandhiji for allowing the Police to do their duty In

;■; r.ard to his protection but he was unsuccessful and that as the
,e f apprehended, thi ^ w ^ ak s P°t was successfully taken advant!

'•go of, by the assassins and Gandhiji was murdered. davan *

3.21 In supplementary questions the Home Minister ™ ao , c v^

-to the precautions taken to prevent the ^KrfiteSddS?

wh.it these precautions were and whether sufficient «w ™2

I 1 '" * JJNCJ the lite of the Ministers ofVvSmenV ^Tne h££

Mi.nsl.er ropl.od Il.nt consistent with the Wishes and irKlinaTions™

Ministers sufficient precautionary measures had been taken. There
were supplementary questions by another Hon'ble Member about
JMathuram Godse and whether the Police had lost track of him, In
reply the Home Minister said that after the arrest of Madanlal a
copy of the statement of Madanlal was taken to Bombay C.I.D.
Arrests were not made because it was considered inexpedient to
do so as by so doing the other conspirators would have gone under-
ground. Therefore, after consultation between the Bombay and the
Delhi Police it was decided that for the moment no arrests should
be made. The Bombay Police was on the track of the conspirators
but they were not all in Bombay.

3.22 Asked whether photographs could have been procured of
those persons, the reply was that all of them, were not at one place
and it was not possible to have photographs of people like that.

3.23 The Home Minister also stated that it was not possible for
the police to take any precautions without consultating Mahatma
Gandhi.

3.24 So this interpellation shows that —

(1) The police considered the search of visitors to Birla House
the most efficacious form of protection to which the Mahatma* was
not agreeable. i

(2) There was after the bomb an increase in the number of
policemen stationed to guard Birla House and a detachment of
troops was also stationed to guard and prevent trespassers.

(3) After the arrest of Madanlal a copy of his statement was
taken by Delhi Police to Bombay C.I.D.

(4) After consultations between the Bombay Police and Delhi
Police it was decided not to make arrests for the moment, in order
to prevent the conspirators going underground,

(5) Bombay Police were on the track of the conspirators.

(6) All the conspirators were not at one place and, therefore it
was not possible to get their photographs.

3.25 Now there are inaccuracies in these answers and in one parti-
cular it is a question for determination as to what document was
taken by the Delhi Police officers to the Bombay C.I.D. The Com-
mission has little or no evidence to show that the Police knew that
the group of conspirators was at one place or different places or
where they individually or collectively were. As a matter of fact
the police had not been able to establish the identity of the conspira-
tors till after the murder.

Third Inquiry

3.26, Then there was the trial of the accused for conspiracy to
murder Mahatma Gandhi in the Court of Judge Atma Charan
Special Judge. An appeal against Ibis judgment was Laken to the

East Punjab High Court where It was heard by e Full Bench who

25

SffHSkMf if If SM ° f ** "»«**ed Persons i.e.
dealt m^A^^^S^S!^^- Thisha sbeen

with whS tni al A SS Srt dSr'f/^ agahlSt the P ^e
of all blame. disagreed and exonerated the Police

Fourth Inquiry

(i^^Bt^&s^ £S ^7\ the r lice h ? Jud ^

lack of a better word bewailed SwE ^ f ° r what ma y f °r the
Police officers regarding SoS Sir! *?L* ^ Invest igating
course of investigation pf the BfcSh P». ^V? phes show the
Bombay and what the 2hZ!^ bo,h , ]n Delhi and in
judge's adverse comments ^ ComlissioTwin fi 6P W he lea ™ ed

as to the investigational processes in Bombay." Nagarvala had *° say

^^^T^l^^^S^.l^ the Com-
Bureau, the late Mr SaniPvi a*J Tte ^ en Dlrec =tor of Intelligence

Minister and was S^SSS^^^SX^ ° f the Home
to Judge Atma Charan's strictures 22 ^n^ion in reply
som e US ef u i information and £ more S ?p! a ' P ° + llCe - Tt cont ^s
of events but because of its excuWo™ t a / ont emporary record

opin^n of so highly ^^^^^^1

MA^W^^^ST R W r M Sh0W how Mr
and what according to him he J& ftt De n • H °"% B ° mb Ca ^
">spectively done, what investigating V hl and B <>mbay had

what information 'was conTeyed^oZJ^ £**£■ ° ut ' and also
J^spective forces. y a l0 " lm b ? the officers of the two

is impoSnt EX - ? iS dlvided into " ^-graphs each one of which

M^mM^$SkMi ^ haS set ^ the facts of
* the bomb by MadLSB^ anThT/ ™' *& and ^tion
-■■"•ape of his companions; recover? *f 1 T^ at the s P°t and
Possession; his interrogation and hk £ J he ^grenade from his
'rationing Karkare aid editor of t L 11^* °? the 20th January
"'others; formation of the con S Diracv^ ni a ? d givin ^ description^
; Jt&rs came to Delhi, where thevsS/ Bombay; how the conspi-
'•"". ■'•«> TVi hi Police had a fair M- f ^tthey did. Theft

PWceed against the editor of n ' w s «"Koiont m.-.toririi ,„

26

consDiracv and apprehend the conspirators. And if the Bombay
pS was informed, it should have been easier still for them.

3 33 The course of investigation at Delhi is then given and also
their making inquiriss at Jullundur where they drew a blank.

3 34 It then states that Mr. Sanjevi himself visited the scene of

somewhere in the Delhi District Record Room.

3 3<i The Delhi Police continued with its investigation and ordered
its C I D to be on the look-out for the conspirators whose descrip-
tion^ wre given in a document Ex. 244 which is a bund e o f^orreej
tions, contradictory descriptions and a mere look at it will show
its worthlessness.

3 36 Paragraph 4 sets out the protective measures taken at Birla
House It shows that the previous strength of the guard consisting
of a Head Constable and 4 Constables which were placed at Birla
n " " September 1947, was increased after the throwing of the
gomb £ fSant Sub- inspector 2 Head C 'ffff^g^SS
Constables In addition, a plain clothes staff of 1 bub-Inspector,
4hSlSJ^ and 2 Constables, all armed with revolvers were
also detailed for protective duty. The note then mentions the pre-
cautions in the nature of search of persons attending the prayer
SitSs which were sought to be taken, but could not be taken
because of the objection of Mahatma Gandhi and by those who were
round about him in his party. A copy of the note showing toe pro-
tective measures which had been taken at Birla House was attached,
annexure VI, Ex. 7-B.

3 37 The note then proceeds to state the steps taken at Bombay.
It mentions that the two officers with all the information furnished
to the Delhi Police by Madanlal flew to Bombay and stayed at the
Universal National Restaurant and met Mr. Nagarvala the next day
and save him all the information that they possessed Mr Nagar-
vala told them that he also had received information about the case
and had deputed special men to locate the wanted persons. He
warned them that nobody should know about their presence Hi
Bombay and so they should not stay in the city because if the
suspected persons came to know of their arrival the whole plan of
their arrests would be "ruined". He ordered the police officers to
go about in mufti. The two officers again met Mr. Nagarvala at his
office They gave him the facts of the case and also showed him
the note on Madanlal's statement from which Mr. Nagarvala took
extracts u Th,e Delhi Police officers told him that one of the accused
Lho editor of the 'A«rani' or the 'Hindu Rashtriy*' newspaper.
,pi i(i ( | rscr jptJon of nil Hh- nccusod persons as disclosed by MwUmlnl,

27

was communicated to him". The Police officers again met Mr.
Nagarvala and he told them, "his information was that there were
more persons in this conspiracy. He said that there
were about 20 persons. He added that he had made special
arrangements for Karkare in Bombay, Poona and Ahmednagar..
About the other persons connected with this case, he said
that he had located three or four". He also disclosed to them the
scheme to locate all the offenders and to carry out their simulta-
neous arrests, his reason being that; if only a few were arrested, the
others would go underground. He also told them that he would
accompany them to Ahmednagar as soon as he got the necessary
information and asked one of his Inspectors to arrange for their
lodging so that nobody should know about their presence. He alsa
told them not to give their Delhi address at the hotel, and that he
would consult his Home Minister and will take further action
against the accused. The same day again they went to the Bombay
C.ILD. office where they were told by an Inspector that their presence
was no longer required. The Inspector also told them that Bombay
officers had been deputed to arrest the other suspects who had not
till then been located. In regard to Karkare and the editor of the
'Agrani' or 'Hindu Rashtriya', he told them that an Inspector from
Ahmednagar was arriving the next day at Bombay, and they would
then arrange for their arr,est".

3.38 This portion of the note thus shows that —

(a) Nagarvala had specially arranged for the arrest
Karkare in Bombay, Ahmednagar and Poona.

of

(b) The information of locating 3 or 4 other persons connect-
ed with the case seems puzzling because there were 6'
persons mentioned by Madanlal and location of 3 or 4
would be solving the mystery of the conspiracy complete-
ly.

(c) The statement, that an Inspector was coming the next day
from Ahmednagar and they would arrange to arrest Karkare
and editor of the 'Agrani', appears to be erroneous. Why
should there have been an Inspector from Ahmednagar
to arrest the editor of the 'Agrani' which was a Poona
paper.

3.39 The next day, i.e., 23rd January, 1948, so the note says, the
Delhi Police officers went to the Deputy Commissioner's office but
could not meet him. A CI.D. Inspector told them that the Inspec-
tor from Ahmednagar had arrived and he had been told to search
for the editor of the 'Agrani* or the 'Hindu Rashtriya', which again
appears to be a wrong statement or misunderstanding by the Delhi
officers. Deputy Superintendent Jaswant Singh then asked for
information regarding Karkare and his associates and the Bombay
CI.D. Inspector gave him the following names as being Karkare'^
associates; —

(i ) Badge of Poona.

(11) Aiii.n Sin/.jli, Punjabi Sikh <>f Amrilsnr.

.

28
(iii) Talwar of Karachi, then in Bombay,
(iv) Balraj Mehta of Lahore, then in Shivaji Park in Bombay.

3.40 Mr. Nagarvala who arrived at about 12.30 p.m. told the
.Police officers that he was doing his best to arrest the wanted
persons and that the presence of the Delhi Police was no longer
required at Bombay and he ordered them to return. "On this Mr
Jaswant Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Delhi, drew Mr"
Nagarvala's attention to Madanlal's statement regarding Karkare
and the editor of the Agrani' or the 'Hindu Rashtriya' and asked
that as soon as they were arrested, they should be sent to Delhi. The
Delhi officers handed over to the C.I.D. Inspector a brief note on the
case, with the names and the description of the accused wanted as
far as known then". Of the handing over of this note there is no
evidence except this cryptic reference. No questions were put to
Mr. Nagarvala although he was questioned at length and was cross-
examined for a good few days. In a subsequent affidavit in reply
to Commissions Questionnaire, Mr. Nagarvala denied any such
document having been given to his officers.

3.41 The two Delhi Police officers returned to Delhi on the 24th
and saw the Superintendent of Police, New Delhi, and the Superin-

i nt ^ P t\ C1D ^ nd gave them m acc ™ nt of all tiuS had
happened m Bombay. Copies of the diaries of the 21st, 22nd and
23rd January, 1948, are attached to this note. They are marked

™7 ^ In .t nd V EX - V- ^ 4 « COpieS ° f t^se diumen" s a were
sent to Mr. V. Shankar, Private Secretary of the Home Minister.

thf-D?eslnofnr?hl ?K at the mystery which was associated with
the presence oi the Delhi Police officers at Bombay, a complaint about
wmch was made to Mr. Sanjevi on the 25th morning. Normally™
says the police officers should not have been sent back to S? but
should have been kept there to assist the Bombay Police in the

3BKTO3 0t i th * CaSe " Xt may be noted that in h & statement r£
Sahib Rikhzkesh, Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., stated Xt these
officers stayed in Bombay too long and should have retu^?Lrlfer

3.42 The Deputy Inspector General of Police (C I D 1 Pnrm Q
who w as still i D Ihi; was summfmed b Mr Sanfevi in ^presence
of the Superintendent of C.I.D., Delhi. To the DH.G. was ffiven thl
report of the two Delhi Police officers and his atten ion w £ dr, wn
2 th V™P? rtance of locating the absconding accused A copv of
the detailed statement of Madanlal was given to hS Both le ahl
Mr Sanjevi went over it, and the D.I.G. was asked to fly £ Bombay
but he did not, as hs could not. If he could not ffi «,„„ y
should have thought that another officer could h a ?e b een' S ent by air

to deliver the statement to Nagarvala He left w «££ 7,7 \J?
bad and reached Bombay on the 27th evenffig! Y " W ° AUana ~

M^ 3 !^^ 8 -^?^^^!*^ ,M;; , ' il| -" i ' 1 "- *Wh t, ■,n| 1(11 , 1 |iv,. Qf

Ml l "" M:: '; I:| << ""••>< llm no expected Iho conspirators to ■tril -

.i •■ ,i l .... I .. .. i ii i . . ■ , I '"" .1 III .,( I |M"

noil

lU .1 M

29

i n 3 *i 4 * Th ^ no i e then states that that evening (of 27th), the D.I.G.
talked to Mr. Sanjevi on the telephone and a gist of the conversa-
tion is given in paragraph 8 which is as follows:—

"On the 27th evening Mr. Rana rang me up from Bombay and
told ma that he had seen Mr. Nagarvala, and that Mr.
Nagarvala would give me an explanation for what had
happened to the two Delhi Police officers at Bombay Mr
Nagarvala told me that he had good reason for not allow-
ing the Delhi Police officers to move about freely in
Bombay. He told me of the information that he and the
^ombay Police had of a conspiracy to kidnap Mahatma

1 u ! e n„ told me that il was a ver y bi S organisation,
with about 20 principal conspirators, each assisted by 20

persons and in possession of considerable quantities of
firearms and other lethal weapons. I asked him about
tne absconding accused whose names or descriptions were
fTl* 1 t0 A the Delhi' Police by Madanlal. Mr. Nagarvala
told me that he would send a detailed note on the investi-
gation made at Bombay City and elsewhere in the Province
by air the next day."

This portion of the note is not quite clear. It does not show what
was said to Mr. Sanjevi by Mr. Rana and which portion was Vm?
Nagarvala. But one fact stated in this paragraph is of grist impS
ance Mr. Sanjevi asked Mr. Nagarvala Sbout the abscondffig SS
whose names or descriptions were given to the Delhi Polic- bv
Madanlal. But this note does not say that those names oVdescrptioS

BombaT C N^ ed t0 , Na S arvala by the tW0 0fficers wh ° were flown to
fw ll' N ,°/ d0e / ll j ay what re Ply hs gave to that query except
that he would write a detailed letter. Significantly, there is notiffi
to show whether Mr Sanjevi pressed Nagarvala to tell him Tnf
had done anything about the suspects whose names or description!
were given to him by Delhi Police or showed any aMxielySufS
arrest or even tried to find out who they were or whether they had
been located at all. On the other hand, Sardar Pate^replFes in

Bombay S and e Dllt S p^ bly ^^ Feb ™ ary 6 ' 1948 ' *howTat the
Bombay and Delhi Police were in accord on the steps taken and ™

ome^ftS °L thS P / OPOSal t0 T ke ^ultaneoia^STjSJcS
some of the accused going underground.

in Mr T S!. n0te % n g l eS ° n t0 say *H Nagarvala did not write
m, ^ - Sa ^ evi „ ,° n the 3 °th he sent a letter which reached

throura e n 1 .ffi/ eb ^ ary 3 ' *l d a C °P y 0f that Ietter was received
through an officer who came by air from Bombay on 1st February
which is annexure I, Ex. 8. But these letters make no mention of
hvVK ? y Mn SanJ!SV i ab0Ut P ersons disclosed to TagarvaL

5^38^7*: they a reply to whatMr - *** WS

+ u 3 r 6 T V he . letter recei ved by Mr. Sanjevi, according to the note

;• l.nc of action by the Bombay Police was indicated wffich was

Ih-'l. I In,,- was a gang out to kidnap Mahatma Gandhi and of The

bSS S.!:^":!/"..?" 1 :.^^ 1 :. f h ~4 w r« those **& , «3

1 Wr

also concerned with the statement of MuJnulal

f

which does not s^sm to be correct as Badge's name is not there.
Significantly the letters did not mention the editor of the 'Agranf
or 'Hindu Rashtriya\ The note, however, emphasised that the
officers had repeatedly given information of all the names and des-
criptions mentioned by Madanlal. It then sets out that Mr. Rana
agreed with M!r. Nagarvala that the arrest of Karkare and Badge
will not arouse any suspicion and the arrests of others could wait
till all the information collected by the Delhi Police, the provincial
Poona C.I.D. and the Bombay City Police were pooled together and
that the Home Minister of Bombay had entrusted the investigation
of the case to Mr. Nagarvala,

3.47 The note makes a grievance that the Bombay police did not
consider it necessary to immediately pursue the information given by
the Delhi police regarding the editor of the 'Hindu Rashtriya*
(Godse) and the other accused mentioned by Madanlal, who should

have been arrested without delay. This grievance would be justi-
fied if it couid b? established that the editor was disclosed in the
first statement or was given^ to Nagarvala by the Delhi Police
officers.

3.48 The note then laments that even 10 days after the Delhi
Police officers had carried vital information about the case, the
Bombay Police had no more information than about the kidnapping
of Mahatma Gandhi, and it did not act on the information given by
the two Delhi Police officers. It complains that Rana had a copy of
the full statement of Madanlal and had been told of the serious
nature of the statement and yet nothing had been done. The respon-
sibility for investigation in Bombay was of the Bombay Police and
the Delhi Police had to depend on the investigation and reports of
Bombay Police. The Delhi Police did not receive between the 21st
and 30th January "any confirmation of MadanlaPs statement" from
the Bombay Police. The note further said —

"The information conveyed by the Delhi Police to the Bombay
Police clearly indicated a conspiracy to murder ' and the
identity of some of the accused. The information conveyed
called for investigation in Bombay City and Province, and
whatever was found in the course of that investigation should
have been conveyed to the Delhi Police. This was not done
except for the telephone message to me on the 27th night when
information of a conspiracy to kidnap Mahatma Ji was men-
tioned."

Nagarvala's letter was a clear proof that the Delhi police were
not told of the exact identity of the editor of the 'Hindu Rashtriya'
paper or of his associates excepting Badge. But at that stage Mr,
Sanjevi did nothing to ask Nagarvala about it. Perhaps the tragedy,
which had ensured was too great that it must have left Mr. Sanjevi
wholly stunned to think of giving much attention to Nagarvala's
letter or its contents whether, they were omissions or commissions.

3.49 Mr. Sanjevi also attached to his note a copy of a demi-official
letter dated the 31st January which was the day after the assassina-
tion. This is annexure II, Ex. 9. The note then sets out the contents

at this letter and the information which Prof. 3 ^^f^J^
authorities in Bombay. The note ^^^^^^J^^Z
fadanlal's statement and Prof. Jain's rtormRU^Jte **^
authorities were working on the theory of an f^^^g
Mahatma Gandhi. It also protested ^^^f^^^^t
Delhi Police had been won over by the gang of kidnappers M
there is nothing to show that Mr, Sanjevi at any stage told the
SSbay Poii^about their lethargy, inattentiveness or cj^MDgl
or gave them a bit of his mind about the absurdity of the kidnapping
theory.

3.50 The note finally said—

"11 It is now definitely known that from the 23rd to the 28th
January, Godse was in Bombay. He flew from the .Bombay
aerodrome to Delhi on the 28th morning. Jrom the 22nd I to
the 28th January was a long enough period for th Bombay
Police to have known who the editor of the 'Agrani or the
Stadu Rashtriya' was. As long as the ^ *^ <^
have full information in regard to the identity a nd correct
description of this person, they could not possibly spot him
when he arrived in Delhi. He had completely changed his
clothes, and on the 30th evening, was wearing a ™h^ khjg
jacket/and went into the prayer grounds with the large crowds
that congregated there. The Delhi Police had not, in the
least relaxed the protective measures at Birla House. Mr
Mehra's note sets out very clearly what precautions and
measures were undertaken. As long as the Police were not
in a position to search visitors to the prayer meetings, the
Police on duty at the Birla House on the 30th could not be
blamed for not spotting one of the visitors who had carried
a small pistol hidden on him. The Police were prevented from
searching visitors. In these circumstances, the Delhi Police
did all that was possible. In his observations the Judge has,
unfortunately, not distinguished between the Delhi and the
Bombay Police. He was not aware of the real position He
did not know that the Bombay Police had not taken all the
action necessary on the information conveyed from Delhi.
Even on the evidence that he had before him, his observations
against the Delhi Police cannot be justified."

3 51 This is the case which was presented to the Ministry of Home
Affairs by the Delhi Police through Mr. Sanjevi Some of the ex-
pressions used in the note and some of the sentences employed have
a very familiar mien and are not far different from the translation
of the Delhi Police diaries of Deputy Superintendent Jaswant Singh
ie. Nos 3-A and 4-A, which perhaps formed the basis of the note
if not its sole inspiration. The note may be summed up as follows:—

(i) After the arrest of Madanlal, a statement, Ex. 6, annexure
III, was made by Madanlal on the night between 20th and
21st January which disclosed a conspiracy to murder
Mahatma Gandhi.

32

(ii) iln the statement of Madanlal the name of Karkare pro-
prietor of a hotel at Ahmednagar, the editor or p?o P rktor
looW^" ?£? U Rashtri ^' or the 'Agrani', ^aratha
yo°uth g were e mSned^ *&■ **»*' and tw0 other

(m) ll^alliSaSlf ^ d ^.Ptaces where Madanlal and
8& T°Z S ad been Staying and as a consequence of
th ls disclosure vigorous combing of the city was carried
out but it was found that the associates had alSy Left

0V) poHcfaSundur 6 * mmdm W3S alS ° fUmished to the

(v) Two officers of the Delhi Police were flown to Bombay who
had full instructions and a brief note containing the facts
of the case ascertained upto that time.

(vi) The description of these persons mentioned bv Madanlal
was circulated to the Delhi C.LD. " audJuai

(vii) Protective measures taken at Birla House were strengthen-

pl&isiisir 1 ^ ° f unifomed **« «*

(viii) The proposal to search persons going to the prayer meet-
ings were not agreed to by Mahatma Gandhi and those
round about him. i.e., his Secretaries, etc.,

(ix) All the information which the Delhi Police had upto that
time was conveyed to Mr. Nagarvala on the 22nd The
note which had been sent to Bombay was shown to Nagar-
vala and the Delhi Police gave him full facts of ;he ?ase
and mentioned that one of the accused was the editor of
Agrani or the 'Hindu Rashtriya' newspaper and the des-
cription of other persons as given by Madanlal was com-
municated to him. He took an extract from the note sent
to him and returned the note to the Delhi policemen.

(x) Nagarvala told them that he had located 3 or 4 persons and
that he was not making any arrests lest the others might
go underground.

(xi) Nagarvala told those policemen not to stay at the Hotel
where they were staying but to shift to another place and
they should move about in mufti. An Inspector agreed
to put the two officers up. s u

(xii) On 23rd January, 1948 at 12-00 noon a C.LD. Inspector told
me Delhi Police officers that an Inspector from Ahmed-
nagar had arrived and he was told to search for the editor
of the Agrani' of the 'Hindu Rashtriya'. The Delhi Police
officers asked for information regarding Karkare and his
associates and the Inspector gave the four names, Badge
Autar Singh Talwar and Balraj Mehta, whose names had
had already been set out.

(xiii) At 12-30 p.m. Mr. Nagarvala arrived and he told the Delhi
Police that he was trying his level best and that their
presence was no longer required at Bombay and they
should return to Delhi, The Delhi Police officers again
drew the attention of Nagarvala to the statement of
Madanlal regarding Karkare and the editor of the 'Agrani'
and asked him to get them apprehended and send them
to Delhi as soon as possible.

(xiv) The Delhi Police officers handed over to the C.LD. Inspec^
tor a brief note on the case, a matter on which no ques-
tions were put by the Delhi Police to any of the Bombay
Police witnesses.

(xv) On their return the Delhi Police officers apprised their
Superintendents of Police of what had happened at
Bombay, and copies of their Police diaries were sent to
Mr, Shankar on 18th February, 1948.

(xvi) On the 25th morning tlie two Superintendents of Police of

Delhi reported the matter to Mr. Sanjevi whose reaction

was that the police officers should have been kept on in

■ Bombay to assist the Bombay Police in the investigation

there.

(xvii) Consequently, Mr. Sanjevi spoke to Mr. Rana and com-
plained to him about th e treatment which was meted out
to the Delhi Police officers.

(xviii) A copy of the fuller statement of Madanlal was given to
Rana. He was asked to fly to Bombay but he could not
do so, and therefore he went by train and arrived at
Bombay on the 27th afternoon.

(xix) Paragraph 8 sets out an account of the telephonic conversa-
tion which took place between Rana and Nagarvala on the
one side and Mr. Sanjevi on the other,

(xx) The letter of Nagarvala reached Mr. Sanjevi on the 3rd
February which purported to have been written on 30th
January, whereas he had promised to write on the 27th
A copy of that letter was brought by the Bombay Police
officer which has also been set out. Both the letters high-
light the theory of kidnapping Mahatma Gandhi and
mentioned the names of only Karkare and Badge and did
not even mention the editor of the 'Agrani* of the 'Hindu
Rashtriya' or of the full information including names and
descriptions given by Madanlal which had been conveyed
to Nagarvala, and it also mentioned that Rana agreed with
what Nagarvala had done and that the investigation in
Bombay, as far as the Province of Bombay was concerned,
had been entrusted to Nagarvala by the Home Minister.

(xxi) It is clear that the Bombay Police did not consider it
necessary to pursue the information given by the Delhi
Police in regard to the editor of the 'Hindu Rashtriya' and

the other accused mention* d by Mndnnini,
259 HA.

34

(xxii) The Bombay police had no other information but that
there was a conspiracy to kidnap Mahatma Gandhi and
that was in spite of their having worked on the case for
10 days.

(xxiii) The note emphasises that the Delhi police had conveyed
to the Bombay police that there was a conspiracy to
murder Mahatma Gandhi and also had conveyed the
identity of the accused to them and that Nagarvala did not
convey to the Delhi police the exact identity of the editor
of the 'Hindu Kashtriya' paper or of his associates except
Badge.

(xxiv) Lastly, Godse was in Bombay between 23rd January and
28th January. He flew from there on the 28th (which is
wrong; he flew on the 27th). The Bombay police should
have discovered by then who the editor of the 'Agranf or
the 'Hindu Kashtriya' was and should have taken vigorous
measures to apprehend him. The Delhi police were not
in a position to arrest anyone of them as they did not have
his identity or the correct description and when he com-
mitted the murder he had changed his dress.

3.52 In short the note accepts unhesitatingly the version given to
Mr. Sanjevi by the Delhi police the most important parts of which

are — i j !; :

(1) Madanlal made a statement on the 20th January giving full
descriptions of his associates, the name of Karkare and
mentioned the editor of the 'Hindu Rashtriya' or the
'Agrani 5 .

(2) This information was sent to Bombay police who did
nothing in the matter and instead embarked on a fantastic
theory of a conspiracy to kidnap Mahatma Gandhi.

(3) The Delhi Police had the descriptions of the conspirators
given by Madanlal which had been relayed to Jullundur
police and had also been given to the Bombay police but
the latter did absolutely nothing in the matter.

(4) Rana had been emphatically told not to sleep over the
matter but he also did nothing.

(5) Although Godse and Apte were in Bombay between the
23rd and "28th January" no attempt was made to locate
or arrest him or his other co-conspirators.

(6) Mr. Sanjevi threw all the blame on the Bombay police.

Mr. Sanjevi is unfortunately dead and this is the only record of
what he did or did not do in regard to Mahatma Gandhi's life and
safety.

3.53 Out of the remarks of Mr. H. V. R. Iengar, Secretary of the
Ministry of TTomo Affairs after the receipt of the explanation from

35

kr. Sanjevi, Ex. 7, and of Mr. Nagarvala, Ex. 14, paragraphs 3, 4 and

5 are important and they are as follows:—

"3 Secondly, while it is clear that the Bombay Police took all
possible steps to arrest Karkare and Badge, they do not appear
to have taken any notice of Godse. Admittedly, his name was
not mentioned in MadanlaTs statement but there was a descrip-
tion of him as the editor of the 'Hindu Rashtriya' or the
'Agranf . According to DJ.B.'s report the investigating officers
from Delhi took with them to Bombay on the 21st January a
statement (Annexure V to D.I.B.'s report— Slip "T") which
mentioned the editor of this paper. Mr. Nagarvala says that
these officers did not give him any information other than that
they wanted Karkare. Here is a discrepancy which cannot
be reconciled without further examination.

4. I have put to the D.I.B. the view that as soon as it became
clear that there was a conspiracy among certain Maharashtra
Brahmins from Poona, Ahmednagar and the "neighbourhood
to commit assassination, plain clothesmen from that part of the
Bombay Province should have been summoned to Delhi, on the
chance that they might have been able to identify these per-
sons if they came to Birla House. Mr. Sanjevi says that as the
Bombay Police did not take the idea of a conspiracy to assassi-
nate very seriously, the responsibility was really theirs. Per-
sonally I do not accept this view and that that there was a
failure in Delhi to insist on this precaution, lit may not have
been successful in preventing the assassination, but it wae
certainly worth trying.

5. I think the Bombay Police are to blame more seriously
because they refused to take the idea of a conspiracy to assas-
sinate seriously, although every rule of eommonsense pointed
in that direction,".

|fj . Two letters of Mr. J. D. Nagarvula

3.54. The two letters of Mr. Nagarvala mentioned in the note,
Ex. 7, are annexures 1 and 2, Exs, 8 and 9, dated January 30, 1948 and

January 31, 1948, respectively — one on the day when Mahatma
Gandhi was murdered, and the other on the day following.

3.55 The first letter shows that MadanlaTs statement in the Press
showing that "he had come from Bombay" led to the initiation of
investigations in Bombay. In the course of preliminary investiga-
tions names of Balraj Mehta, Karkare, Talwar, Badge, Autar Singh
Chavan, and Somnath Kapoor transpired of whom Autar Singh and
Chavan were under detention. Balraj had been identified and a trial
put on him. Karkare and Badge were the two Maharashtrian com-
panions of Balraj and Somnath Kapoor who were both Punjabis
Badge had been seen in Ahmednagar three days earlier i.e., on the
27th, and arrangements had been made to bring informants from
Ahmednagar to Bombay who knew both Karkare and Badge, the
Object being to get them (Badge and Karkare) identified and to arrest
rendezvous in Bombay was known to the Police

36

and if he came to Bombay he would be arrested but Talwar had not

been identified and inquiries were going on.

3.56 From the investigation it appeared that there were 21 Punja-
bis and Maharashtrians in the conspiracy and they had 20 vvorkers
under each one of them. The object of the gang was to drive out
Muslims from the Indian Dominion. With that object they had
collected arms and ammunition and it was also learnt that Col. Mohan
Singh of the LN.A. had organised the gang and he had the support
of the Akali leader, Master Tara Singh. But the information had not
yet been corroborated. There was also a suggestion that one of the
Sikh refugees had been sent by the gang to the Speaker of the Uitar
Pradesh Assembly for further consultations as to their plan. The
opinion amongst the members of the gang was that it was easy to
win over the Delhi Police and their object was to kidnap Gandhiji,
But the letter made it clear that this was only an Information which
have been collected but they had yet to see if it was correct. Nobody
had been arrested but a fair amount of progress had been made in
the investigation.

3.57 The general policy which Nagarvala proposed to follow was
(and Mr. Rana agreed with him) that they might arrest Karkare and
Badge which was not likely to rouse any suspicion because Karkare
had been named by Madanlal and Badge was always with Karkare
and they were known by the police to be good friends. Mr. Rana
agreed with Nagarvala that arrests of others should wait till the
Information collected by the Delhi Police, Poona Provincial C.I.D.
and the Bombay City C.I.D. was pooled together. The Home Minister
of Bombay and Mr. Rana had entrusted the investigation of the case
to him (Nagarvala) for the Province of Bombay and Nagarvala was
hoping to produce concrete results,

3.58 The letter of the 31st said that Nagarvala had arrested Balraj
Mehta, Somnath Kapoor, Kasar — the bodyguard of Savarkar— and
Damle, his Secretary. It had also transpired that Godse had seen
Savarkar along with one Apte on the eve of their departure to Delhi.
Kasar and Damle had not stated what conversation these two had
with Savarkar during their 40 minutes interview but they had admit-
ted that these two had access to the house of Savarkar without any
restriction. If Madanlal was brought to Bombay, they would be able
to "drag out Madanlal and get all facts and details out of him". He
had also consulted the Home Minister and the Commissioner of
Police and they agreed that Madanlal should be brought to Bombay
and that would help the investigation in Bombay.

3.59 Badge had been arrested by the Poona Police. The letter
then mentions the tense 24 hours through which Bombay had passed.
Savarkar's house and other houses of Hindu Mahasabha* leaders were
attacked by mobs with terrific fury and the only safe place for those
leaders was the police lock-up. Savarkar's house had been searched
and all available records of Hindu Mahasabha had been attached and
inquiries wore in progress. As the copy of the previous letter sent
by Nagarvala had not been received by Mr. Sanjevi, he enclosed a

of thai letter along with this one,

37

3.60 The first letter requires a careful analysis and scrutiny.

(1) It shows that it was written in pursuance of the conver-
sation which Nagarvala had with Mr. Sanjevi on January
27, 1948.

<2) That after the statement of Madanlal appeared in the
Press about his being from Bombay, investigations were
taken up. There is no mention of either the orders of
Mr. Morarji Desai or of what Jain had told Mr. Besai.

<3) It does not specifically mention any information having
been given to Nagarvala by the Delhi Police officers.

<4) It does mention MadanlaPs statement wherein Karkare
was named,

<5) It mentions that Karkare and Badge were two Maharash-
trian companions of Balraj and Somnath Kapoor; and the
former two were good friends.

<6) It then states that Badge was seen at Ahmednagar about
27th January but he had left that place and that two in-
formants had been called from Ahmednagar who would
identify and help in the arrest of Karkare and Badge.
Now if badge belonged to Poona and Karkare to Ahmed-
nagar, even if they were friends, one would have expected
that informants would be called from P'oona also.

<7; The letter mentions a large number of Punjabis and
Maharashtrians being in the conspiracy which was being
organised by Col. Mohan Singh of the LN.A.

This gentleman was examined by the Commission (wit. 86)
and he denied any knowledge of this gang and it is diffi-
cult to imagine that Col. Mohan Singh would be a party
to encouraging either the assassination or the kidnapping
of Mahatma Gandhi and it would be still more astonish-
ing if the then Speaker of the Uttar Pradesh Assembly
could be persuaded to join the plan. Even if the objec-
tive was eviction of Mohammedans, the Speaker was un-
likely to give his bleassings to any such action.

<8) Although the letter mentions that the plan was to arrest
Karkare and Badge, there is no indication as to what tan-
gible steps had been taken to carry out the plan.

<9) The most important omission isj the non-mention of
either the editor or the proprietor of the 'Agrani' or the
'Hindu Rashtra' because that seems to have been empha-
sised again and again in the note of Mr. Sanjevi. This
would show that either these persons were never men-
tioned till then or Nagarvala was deliberately omitting
them. The latter possibility appears unlikely in the cir-
cumstances.

<10) There is no indication in the note that in the telephonic
talk with Nagarvala Mr. Sanjevi mentioned either of these
two persons All he snys in the nolo is, "T nsked him

38

about the absconding accused whose names or descrip-
tions were given to the Delhi Police by Madanlal and
Nagarvala promised to send a detailed note". One should
have imagined that if the editor of this newspaper had
been mentioned, Mr. Sanjevi would have made pointed
inquiries about the editor and/or the proprietor.

(11) Further, there is nothing to indicate in this note, Ex. 7,
that when Nagarvala mentioned the conspiracy to kidnap
Mahatma Gandhi, Mr. Sanjevi ticked him off or told him
that the very theory or idea was absurd.

Commission has been unable to discover any reason why Mr.
Nagarvala in his letter made the Press report of Miadan-
lal's statement the basis of his investigation rather than
the information or the order given to him by Mr. Morarji
Desai, the factum of which is not denied and was accept-
ed both by the trial court as well as by the High Court
in the Conspiracy Case. Unfortunately, this matter was
not put to Mr. Nagarvala before the Commission.

(12) The omission of reference to names, descriptions, avoca-
tions or places of residence of MadanlaPs co-conspirators
has remained unexplained.

(13) The letter of the 30th by Nagarvala to Mr. Sanjevi was
top secret and there could not have been any inherent
danger in diclosing to Mr. Sanjevi the factum of informa-
tion given by Mr, Morarji Desai or the order he passed.

4

.8

CHAPTER IV— INQUIRIES— BOMBAY

Index of Paragraphs
First Inquiry
Assembly Interpellations.
4.10-23 Second Inquiry-
Mr. Karaite's letters and
Mr. Rana's replies

Fourth Inquiry-
Assembly debate
Mr. Nagarvala's explanation

4.24

4.27

CHAPTER IV
Inquiries* — Bombay

4.1 In Bombay there were four inquiries into the causes of
■Gandhi murder and what steps were taken by the Government of
Bombay to prevent the catastrophe.

4.2 (1) Soon after the murder of Mahatma Gandhi, there was
interpellation in the Bombay Legislative Assembly in which certain
questions were given notice of but actually they were withdrawn
but there is some material to show as to what was the position of
the Government at that time.

4.3 (2) Mr. Kamte, who was Inspector General of Police in Bom-
bay Province, started an inquiry by writing to Mr. U. H. Rana, D.I.G.,
C.I.D., Poona, and that correspondence shows what Mr. Kamte
wanted to know; what enquiries he made from Mr. Rana; and what
replies Mr. Rana gave.

4.4 (3) In the Bombay Legislative Assembly, there was a Cut
Motion and the matter of Mahatma Gandhi's murder was discussed.
Mr. Morarji Desai there made a statement which may be taken to
be the position of the Government of Bombay at that time.

4.5 (4) After strictures were passed by the trial judge, Judge
Atma Char an in his judgment, the Government of India through the
Government of Bombay asked for the explanation of the Bombay
Police officers in regard to those strictures. Mr. Nagarvala gave his
explanation (Ex. 14) on which there were certain notings in the
Bombay Secretariat, Ex. 168. That explanation came without any
remarks from the Bombay Government to the Government of India
and was considered by the Government of India upon which ,and
upon the explanation of the Delhi Police there were combined not-
ifies by Mr. H. V. R. Iengar, Home Secretary— Ex. 7-C i.e. on the
explanation of Mr. Sanjevi, Ex 7, and on the explanation of Mr.
Nagarvala, Ex. 14. The views of the Government of India were
these which may briefly be stated,

4.6 Mr. lengar made two points :

(1) That it was surprising that in spite of the statement of
Madanlal and the information given by Prof. Jain, the
Bombay Police should have hesitated to "accept the theory
of conspiracy to murder and should have given credence
to the theory of a conspiracy to kidnap Mahatma Gandhi.

(2) That the Bombay Police took all possible steps to arrest
Karkare and Badge but took no notice of Godse whose
description as editor had been given in Madanlal's state-
ment as shown by Annexure 5 (which is Ex. 5-A). He

41

noticed the denial oil! Mr. Nagarvala about any informa-
tion other than that about Karkare. He also noticed that
as the conspirators were Maharashtrians plain clothes
policemen from that part of Bombay Province should have
been summoned to Delhi. He did not accept the view that
the responsibility was of the Bombay Police because of
their failure to take notice of the theory to murder but
the Bombay Police were more to blame for not taking a
commonsense view of murder being the object of the con-
spiracy. He also noticed the most controversial part as
to the identity of the editor of the Agrani and again
blamed the Bombay Police for not taking the conspiracy
to' murder seriously.

4.7 Sardar Patel agreed (Ex. 7-E) that plain -clothes policemen
from Bombay should have been summoned and that it was a mis-
take to send a Deputy Superintendent of Police to Bombay. The
matter was sent to the Prime Minister and his endorsement Is dated
April 4 5 1949. The notings in the Government of India Secretariat
and in the Bombay Government Secretariat will be discussed at
greater length under the heading Ex. 5-A.

First Inquiry

4.8 The first inquiry which was held in Bombay was by way of
notice of a starred question. No. 864 by Mr. A. J. Doddameti in the
Bombay Legislative Assembly. This was on 20th February 1948,
The questions and the proposed answers are as follows as shown in
Ex. 167 : (See the attached photostat copy,)

Short notice question No. 864
put by Mr. A. J. Doddameti.

Will the Hon'ble Minister for
Home and Revenue be pleased

to state —

(1) whether it is a fact that
the plot for the assassi-
nation of Mahatma Gan-
dhi and plans for the
assassination of other
high-ranking Indian lea-
ders were hatched in
the Bombay Province ;

(2) whether reports regard-
ing the existence of
such a plot had reached

Government, prior to
the assassination of
Mahatma Gandhi;

(3) if so, what precaution-
ary measures were

taken by Government

Proposed reply

(1) As the investigation into
the alleged conspiracy is
still not complete, it is too
early to give any infor-
mation on the question
asked in this clause.

(2) A private report reached
Government on 21st Jan-
uary regarding such a
plot. (In the original this
is handwritten.)

(3) The Home Ministry was
informed about this on
22nd morning and the

»T<h"rt\if.t

tflhl linn

^mqp

w v ».• ft t » * rt* « t>\ 1 nt* tl on C

H

J\ort notice question No* *9fi4 put

Will the JWbla Minister for "=•
Home ana ^y mrxG-pvypy &&&&&■.£&
atate ~
(X) sft ether- i* j, c s fa;;:: vbat the
, plat for fch-5 i^^a&^i7iatic.'i i>f

^^vlM-u --• .• ■ c'lr.u hi ,h-^riciiv -
Tx&iii Ifc-oC5r»t> w. r h&toh&d in the
i'k? .rap n y : : ; rvoVl-n c £ ; :■'■■ '. : : t "- : - :; > :

{2} v.b?ir.&i-- rzpovis ^afji^ the

■•:^-Vv/ .::■■>■.;■•,;..;,->' •>....;:.v.- : ..

36 .fa rfiim tea > .-i u-. c province in

■ iff 1$ mfii-m . y|^|^^^^^-|§S

Propoasd reply* .

Illllll

{1} A *j the Iftveo-Ol^ttU n into thi>
alle«^<l conspiracy fr»-«>«*ft»a&rift^fj ' .

X^^kc^es Is a till not complete, it i« p
too early to jive any information

*{

(-} Bs^a-a^t a.4*U&.~, T^f

' : '*V%>^V : >«?/~J^'V^\~y ^ i-^Xvl*.^ - •'",

VVU..^:

.;,.*<

(A; •:.;$& £ person a hsv.s- been : «rr^ tea ■:'!

|||i lliill

Ex. 167— Photostat copy of a Short Notice Question on 'precautionary
measures to prevent assassination of Mahatma Gandhi V (Para. No. 4.8)

that followed, rf suspected persons.

(This is also handwrit-
ten.)

(4) what is the number (dis- (4) Some persons have been

+,int wvqp^ nf the mem- arrested in connection

bSTT* the l K S^S "so with the action o

far arrested in the Pro- Mahatma Gandhi. It is

%nce in connlction not possible to say at this

wSh the assassination stage how many of them

of Mahatma Gandhi? are members of the R.S.S.

Sangh.

This shows that in the proposed answers it was stated in replyto
Question No l-(l" that the investigation into the conspiracy was not
Slete ill then and it was too early to give any information (2)
raSer to second question whether information oi existence .of
such a plot had reached the Government P™f to the assas smution
™- Ant the answer proposed by the office was "No , but Mr. Moraru
ne?af made corrects in his own hand showing that a report had
rlac^r^vernment on 21st January, 1948, (3) in reply to quejtam
Nn^ whether any precautionary measures were taken, the leply
SoLrdbv office was "does not arise" but the correction made m
S P own h?nd X M* Morarji Desai is "The Home Ministry was
informed about this on 22nd morning and the C.I.D. Bombay ***
steps to watch the movements of suspected persons" and (4) in the
fourth Question it was asked how many members of the R.&S. had
been arSd in connection with the murder of Mahatma Gandhi,

ana\Tatswer was that some P«»™ ^^^^ ^
not possible to say how many of them were R.b.b. members, a
XtostaT copy of the questions and the answers as given in Ex. 167
is attached hereto. (See next page).

49 The Bombay Government has also placed on record the
noting on thes? questions which were to be asked. The noting is
Ex 167-A. On this document the final note is by Mr Morarji Desai
dated 4th March 1948 in which he has said that the Honourable
Member should be persuaded to withdraw the question as this matter
is sub judice and the replies would create complications and con-
sequently the question was withdrawn.

Second Inquiry

Kamte's letters and Rana's replies

4.10 Correspondence which passed between the Inspector General
of Bombay, Mr. N. M. Kamte, and the DIG., CJI.D., Mr U. H.
Rana constitutes evidence of some importance concerning the in-
vestigation into the bomb case, its defects, omissions and lapses ^as
discefnibk On February 6, 1948, Mr. Kamte wrote a letter to his
discer mme ^ L. 31-A saying that he had carefully gone

through the statement of Madanlal which had been sent to him and
which showed that there was sufficient indication to make out that

44

m

there was a plot to kill Gandhi ji hy certain Poona men and he
wanted information on two matters from Mr. Rana—

(1) What steps were taken by him to arrest them immedia-
tely; and

(2) what steps were taken to send men to Delhi to comb out
Delhi and arrest, them there.

These were two specific questions to Mr. Rana asking about steps!
taken by Mr. Rana. To this Mr. Rana's reply is Ex 31 dated Feb-
ruary 24, 1948. In this letter he has set out the facts and sequence
of events and of the action taken by the Delhi Police and Bombay
Special Branch and Poona C.I.D. It says that on the 21st morning
when two Delhi Police officers met him and presumably (although
it is not so stated) gave him the information they had upto then,
he (Rana) told them at once that the gang must be followers cf Dr.'
Savarkar and suggested the sending of two police officers to con-
tact Mr. Nagarvala at Bombay and Rao Sahib Gurtu at Poona and
accordingly two officers were flown to Bombay. By that time, the
Rombay Police had also come to know about Karkare and some
enquiries had been made or as he put it this information had al-
ready been worked out by the Bombay City Police. The Delhi Police
officers went and stayed at the National Hotel which was in the
locality of the Sher-e-Punjab Hotel whose proprietor Avtar Singh
had been detained by the Bombay City Police and whose name had
transpired as one of the conspirators to kill Mahatma Gandhi.

4.11 The Delhi officers were in their uniforms with their revolvers
and were going about Bombay, trying to locate "KIRKAREE" and
not Karkare. They themselves knew nothing about Bombay When
they met Nagarvala, he asked them to change their place of resi-
dence but as they expressed their inabilitv to go anywhere one of
the Inspectors of the Bombay C.I.D. volunteered to put them up,

4.12 Mr. Nagarvala also told them that if they wanted to move
about, they must do so in muftL

413 The movements of the officers were never restricted but it
was explained to them that H was futile to make open street en-
quiries about Karkare who did not belong to Bombay and regard-
ing whom enquiries were already afoot. They were asked to Ques-
tion Avtar Singh but they expressed their unwillingness to do so
and decided to return immediately, Nagarvala had received no in-
structions through these police officers and he had no authority to
detain them further and they left.

4 14 The letter then says that Madanlal did not make a state-
ment making a clean breast till about the 23rd or 24th The r.olice '
officers returned to Delhi by train on the 24th and they saw him
(Rana) on the 25th. Thereafter the D.I.B. called Rana "and asked
him why the officers were not allowed to move about and Rana told
him that Nagarvala must have done it for sound reasons. Madan-
lal s statement was made available to Mr. Rana on the 25th and he
oil h l Same night by train ™<* Allahabad reaching Bombay on the
27th afternoon ;«..,! ho found (hat investigation of N;i,.;.. vala ^

on the right lines. The whole case was discussed with Nagarvala
who gave him an idea of the investigation that had already been.
done and that he had learnt the names of Madanlal's associates-
through a source.

4.15 Thereupon the D.I.B. was contacted on the telephone and
he was told of the "extreme necessity of every possible precaution
tor the protection of Mahatma Gandhi". The D.I.B. was told "to
take every possible precaution for the protection of Mahatma
Gandhi. This in itself will prove that both the Delhi and Bombay
Police have done all they could". Nagarvala was in touch with
them in Ahmednagar and every attempt was made to locate Kar-
kare in Ahmednagar and Bombay but Karkare never went back
to Ahmednagar. He returned to Bombay after a tour around Ma-
thura and Agra and returned to Delhi on the 27th. Delhi Police
had asked Nagarvala for no other person than Karkare and every
attempt was made to locate him, Nagarvala asked him (Rana) to
■end somebody who would be able to identify the associates of Kar-
kare from Poona and Ahmednagar. Rana left for Poon a on the
28th and asked the D.S.P. Poona to spare hi s L.I.B. Inspector An-
garkar. This was on the 29th. But that gentleman was down with
fever. He sent a wireless message to recall Dy. S. P. Deulkar, who
was in Colaba district at the time and he returned on the 30th night.
Immediately thereafter officers were sent by plane as there was a
lurking suspicion that these men will attack other Ministers in the
Central Cabinet. Four officers were sent by plane. From the facts
which were revealed later, the culprits had slipped out on the
morning of 28th from Bombay.

4.16 To this letter Mr. Kamte replied by his letter, Ex. 32 dated

March 6, 1948. He restated the two questions he had asked to which,

according to him, Rana's reply appeared to be in the negative. He

pen asked Rana to give his remarks on certain specific matters .

loch were — ■

(1) What did the two police officers tell him (Rana) on the
21st which was not quite clear from the letter?

(2) Why did he not ask his own C.I.D. to make inquiries
because 4wo officers from Delhi were not going to make
much headway in Bombay or Poona?

(3) The object of contacting Nagarvala by these police officers ;
was not stated.

(4) The statement of Madanlal was given to him (Rana) on
the 25th. What action did he take till the evening of
27th?

(5) The information that Nagarvala came to know through a
source of associates of Madanlal was not correct because
all he had known by then was Karkare's name and the
other information was very vague. But in Madanlal's

itatemeftt, pp. 7, 16, 18, etc., the description given therein
ihOV '1 thai the othnr nccusod wore Codso, Apfo, Badge,

46

etc. Why was there no attempt made to arrest them as
from the 25th evening.

(6) Although on the 27th he had telephoned to the D.I.B.
about taking precautions for the protection of Mahatma-
ji, he could very well have deputed his own C.LD. men
to Delhi because MadanlaFs statement showed that there
was a plan to kill Mahatma Gandhi by men from Bombay
Province.

(7) Mr. Kamte could not subscribe to the proposition that the
Bombay Police had done all that they could in -the matter
of precautions to be taken about Mahatma Gandhi and the
best thing which Rana could have done on the 29th was to
have sent for Rao Sahib Gurtu and get that officer on the
move.

(8) Sending of men by plane to Bombay was done, at the
suggestion of Mr. Kamte and not at Mr. Rana's for which
Mr. Rana could not take any credit.

4.17 This letter makes some telling points of criticism — (a) why
Rana did not send his own C.LD. to make enquiries rather than send
Delhi Police officers; (b) why he did not send his own C.LD. to
Delhi to protect the Mahatma; and (c) why he did not get hold of
Gurtu even on 29th January.

4.18 The next letter of importance is Mr. Rana's reply to Mr.
Kamte, Ex. 30, dated April 15, 1948. The following are the salient
rpoints from this letter: —

(1) It was wrong assumption to make that Madanlal straight-
away gave the names of his accomplices. His statement
was made available to him (Rana) on the afternoon of
25th January, 1948. It was on that day that he first came
to know about what Madanlal had said. In this statement,
Madanlal had mentioned the editor of Hindu Rashtriya
daily and the proprietor of Shastra Bhandar of Poona
and Karkare of Ahmednagar.

(2) The two officers who came to see him (Rana) were
Rikhikesh and Bhatia and not the two who had been sent
to Bombay and from their talks he (Rana) concluded that
the exploding of the brick was the work of Savarkarvadi
group of the Hindu Mahasabha. Thus Rana told these
two officers on the 21st before Madanlal made any state-
ment which is rather important because one of the points
in controversy is when did Madanlal disclose the names
and give description of his associates. The officers who
went to Bombay were not the same to whom Rana had
talked and they did not see Rana on their return. "My
suspicion of Savarkarvadi group's role in the conspiracy
was also confirmed by the D.LB." who had been in-
formed by the Home Minister that Madanlal had met

before he came i.» Delhi and this suspicion was

47

further confirmed by the fact that the two officers were
sent back from Bombay.

(3) Rana did not think it necessary to take any further action
because he presumed that the gang must have been
located in Bombay and he had one C.LD. Head Constable
Yadav in Delhi who was directed to move about in
Delhi and visit railway stations and try to locate Karkare
whom the Head Constable knew "as a Communist from
Ahmednagar". Rana did not think it necessary to send a
special man from Bombay to Delhi. Rana's explanation
for not doing anything further was that he had g-'ven
instructions to the Delhi Police officers in regard to what
was to be done in Bombay and Poona.

(4) En route from Delhi to Bombay, Rana got fever. He went
straight to Nagarvala who showed him what investigation
had been done and Rana showed the statement of Madan-
lal which tallied with the information of Savarkarvadi
group. Rana told him that he would send him a copy of
MadanlaFs statement immediately after reaching Poona
to enable him to start further investigation in Bombay

- and Nagarvala asked him to send Poona Police officers to
help him to identify those people and he specially asked
for Angarkar. But Rana could not go to Poona as he had
developed fever;

(5) Rana talked to the D.LB. and told him that Nagarvala was
on the right lines and requested him to tighten up the
arrangements at Birla House which showed that Rana
took the necessary action in the matter.

(6) Next morning he told the Home Minister, Bombay, of the
lines of investigation.

(7) He reached Poona at 4 p.m. and tried to get Angarkar but
he was ill and then he tried to contact Deulkar but he
was away to Colaba and therefore a wireless message was
sent on the 29th.

(8) The officers who flew to Bombay were not the ones who
came to see him on the 2:1st January. And Rana did not
make use of the telephone because the Delhi Police officers
had gone with instructions from their own officers. More-
over, there was no secrecy in the telephone communica-
tion which would be supported by the D.LB. and was
clear from the fact that the telephone operators were
chuckling when he and Rana were talking soon after the
tragedy of 30th showing that there was a leak in the
telephone operations.

(9) That in the note book which Nagarvala had, there were
seven or eight names and one of them was of Badge and
therefore it was no1 correct that the only '^^m^ that
Notary; hen was Karkare's.

48

(10) Attempts to arrest Karkare and Badge were started long
before 25th January 1948 and Nagarvala was doing his
best in that connection.

(11) It was incorrect that Rana knew about the names of
Godse, Apte and Badge and that that fact was also known
to Nagarvala. "The fact is, as far as I am concerned, I did
not know till I reached Poona who the editor and pro-
prietor of Hindu Rashtriya was".

As far as the Commission has been able to see, Mr. Rana made
no effort to find out their identity or to take action to get
them apprehended.

(12) Moreover the impression Rana had was that the gang
would be hiding in Bombay or roundabout Bombay and
that he (Rana) met the Home Minister at Bombay on the
28th and he told him that Nagarvala was on the right
track.

(13) He (Rana) had got his officers on the move on 29th Janu-
ary 1948 within a short time that he had at his disposal.
"However, I will make it more clear. Rao Sahib Gurtu
was there when D.S.P. Poona was called and the names
of Apte, Godse and Badge were known from Rao Sahib
Gurtu. I also asked him if Angarkar knows all three to-
which his reply was, in the affirmative". There was no
question of getting Gurtu and others in Poona on the
move because the culprits were hiding in Bombay and
the Bombay Special Branch were on their watch. The
letter ended by saying "It is really disgraceful in that
we have not been able to prevent this, and now I wonder
if really we can justify our existence as C.LDs".

4.19 Ex. 33 contains the opinion of Mr. Kamte on Mr. Rana's
letter, Ex. 30, of April 15, 1948. Ex. 33 has got no date but it only
shows the reaction of Mr. Kamte. He there points out what should
have been done. In the opinion of the Commission it is a document
of some importance. In paragraph (1) Mr. Kamte has said that
when the D J.G. got MadanlaFs statement on the 25th January, he s
should have taken action himself and not depended on Delhi officers.

(2) The D.LG. cannot be absolved of his failure to contact \he
Poona C.I.D. giving instructions to arrest the persons whose namea
or descriptions were known from Madanlal's statement and it was
no use finding fault with Delhi Police officers. The D.LG. should
have immediately informed Rao Sahib Gurtu. Even if the D.LG.
had fever, he could have sent a code telegram to Rao Sahib Gurtu
and his telephoning to the D.LB. was not the point at issue. The
"only fact" was that he failed to take action immediately after re-
ceiving the statement of Madanlal. When he reached Poona, Rana
should have asked the A.D.I.G. to arrest the persons whose names
and descriptions had been disclosed in Madanlal's statement.

(3) If telephone conversation were considered undesirable, the
D.LG. should h l1 ;i civil cipher codr telegram,

49

(4) The names that the D.LG. saw in Nagarvala's note book were
act the names which Madanlal's statement disclosed and he wanted
to know 'why the Poona C.ID. did not go to arrest man from
Maharashtra .

(5) It may be true that the D.LG. did not know the editor and
proprietor of the Hindu Rashtra till he reached Poona. Therefore
it would have been better if he had informed Rao Sahib Gurtu by
cipher telegram.

(6) Merely telling the D.LB. to take preventive measures was
not enough. The D.LG. should have sent his own men from Poona
tor the purpose. !

\u (7 ^o^f D *' G * has said that Rao Sahib Gurtu was present when
the D.b.P. Poona was called and, the names of Apte, Godse and
Badge were known from Rao Sahib Gurtu. That is exactly what
Mr. Kamte had been saying all these days.

he

(8) If Rao Sahib Gurtu had been informed by the D.I G
would have taken necessary action.

(9) The culprits might have been in Bombay or near Bombay
but if the Poona C.LD. had information they would have made in-
quiries in Poona and if they thought that the culprits belonged to
Savarkar group, they would have gone to Bombay.

(10) It was unfortunate that the D.LG. did not realise the neces-
sity of sending a man to Delhi immediately.

4.20 But what follows takes away the force of the criticism be-
cause it says, "he was being corrected for not realising this so that
In future he may not commit these mistakes again". Unfortunately
there cannot be Gandhis over and over again, at least not in the
very near future, and therefore this admonishing was wholly
fatuous. j " J

4.21 This correspondence to which the Commission has attached
great importance shows this: i

at Poona

(1) That Mr. Rana should have contacted his 1 men
rather than sending Delhi Police officers there.

(2) After getting the statement of Madanlal on the 25th he
should immediately have got into touch with Rao Sahib
Gurtu and asked him to get on the move.

(3) The D.LG. had failed in taking proper measures.

4.22 The correspondence also shows that the statement of
Madanlal, which was first made, did not particularise any person,
excepting Karkare and the names or avocations of others were not
givett. Whether the descriptions were there or not is not easily dis-
cernible. J

I 2f>0 ITA.

50

4.23 In the opinion of the Commission the assessment of Mr.
Kamte was correct and had the DJ.G. taken only the most element-
ary step of asking his C.I.D. Poona about the identity of the asso-
ciates of Karkare or Madanlal he would most probably have found
out who they were. At any rate if officers could be flown from
Poona after the murder to protect the Ministers in the Central Cabi-
net, the same course could have fruitfully been adopted after the
bomb was thrown and MadanlaPs statement of the 24th or 25th
January had become available.

Fourth Inquiry

4.24 The fourth inquiry in Bombay was by way of a Cut Motion
in the Bombay Legislative Assembly dated 12-3-1949 Ex. 232
where Mr. Morarji Desai gave his version of the Government that
Prof. Jain had seen him on 21st January 1948 and had given him
certain information but Jain had not told him that he had also
seen Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan, and Jain's name was not disclosed
to the police before the 30th because Jain did not want his name to
be disclosed. He then said that whatever information he had re-
ceived he conveyed to Sardar Vallabhbhai Pate] at Ahmedabad
where he, Mr. Desai, specially went to give that information to him.
He also said that not only he informed Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel,
but he also informed Mahatma Gandhi himself and told him that
there was a real danger to his life and he implored him to be more
careful and the only effective way that the danger could be checked
was to search every person who was going to his residence or to his
prayer meeting. But it was not possible to search these people
without Mahatma Gandhi's knowledge and Mahatma Gandhi did
not agree to any such thing. Mahatma Gandhi said that he would
stop his prayers and go away from Delhi rather than reconcile him-
self to the people being subjected to searches. That is why it was
not possible for the Delhi Police to take better steps and the
Bombay Police could do nothing in the matter. He said:

"I told the police officer to take action against everybody who
came under suspicion. Mr. Jain has not said that he gave me
names of two other persons who ultimately were found to be
in the conspiracy and who had nothing to do with the

1 offence I have stated what steps were taken by the

police force. I know all that because I was Inquiring of the
police officer constantly as to what was being done not only
before the incident, but even afterwards when the offence
was being investigated, because I wanted to give him the
benefit, if any of my views and knowledge. I found that
they were constantly on the move. Even at midnight I found
that they were on duty. I found that the Police were not
even caring for their meals. They had so much concentrated
on the work. That is why I cannot say that they failed in
their duty." >

4.25 The Minister then denied the complaint of Prof Jain that
he was insulted or shouted, down when he went the next time after
the murder to see the Ministers.

51

'Nagarvala' s explanation

4:26 Mr. Nagarvala was asked to give his explanation which he
did and is marked Ex. 14. It was sent to Government of India by
Mr. Dehejia with his letter, Ex. 170 dated 25th March, 1949. Ex. 14
sets out the steps taken by him in the investigation, if one may so
call it, which he conducted in Bombay after Mr. Morarji Desai gave
him information about Karkare, etc. It is really a copy of the Crime
Report from January 21, 1948 to January 30, 1948, It is not neces-
sary to repeat the contents here because they are contained in the
chapter dealing with the investigation at Bombay. To this he at-
tached his letter to Mr. Sanjevi, Appendix A dated January 30,
1948 which is really Ex. 8. He also attached to his explanation cer-
tain other appendices— Appendix B, a list of places watched and
names of persons watched during that period; Appendix C, his
statement in court, portion of statement of Inspector Pinto and
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Jaswant Singh.

4.27 When this explanation, Ex. 14, was received in the Secreta-
riat, there was certain noting on it (Ex. 168) which was adverse to
what Nagarvala had done. The office pointed out the various in-
firmities in the investigation which are worth mentioning.

(1) Badge was well-known to D.SP. Poona. Why was he not
contacted and why was Karkare made the central figure and the case
started with Madanlal,

(2) Why did the Delhi Police not bring MadanlaPs statement on
January 22, 1948.

(3) What efforts were made to establish contact with Delhi and
what action did Rana take on MadanlaPs statement.

(4) Did Nagarvala spot an editor with initials N.V.G. from
Poona who was MadanlaPs companion.

(5) Did Nagarvala go to Ahmednagar to look for links of Madan-
lal there. Who was handling the investigation at Ahmednagar and
Poona. If Badge was seen in Ahmednagar three days before and he
was suspected, why was no action taken.

4.28 When this note went to Mr. Morarji Desai, he held a dis-
cussion with his Secretary and finally it was decided that Ex. 14 with
the appendices should be sent on to the Government of India.

4.29 On the receipt of this explanation and explanation of Mr,
Sanjevi, Ex. 7 with the annexures, Mr. lengar made his remarks
which have already been set out and Hon'bie the Home Minister,
Sardar Patel, gave his remarks. The file was finally sent to
Hon'ble the Prime Minister who just signed it.

±

CHAPTER V— SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY

Index of Paragraphs

?5.3 Movements of conspirators as shown by judgments.

5.9 Prosecution story

.5.17 Courts' findings

5.19 Meeting after release of convicted prisoners.

5.21 News in Indian Express

5.22 Times of India
5.27 Ketkar detained

5.29 Interpellation in State Legislative

5.30 Assembly and Parliament's interest

5.34 Commission appointed and terms

5.42 Trial Court and High Court findings and discussion
of terms of reference

5.49 Scope discussed

5.63 Construction by Commission

$g»

CHAPTER V
Scope of the Inquiry

51 The circumstances under which this Commission was ap-
Domid are these On January 30, 1948, Mahatma Gandhi was shot
dead He was the topmost leader of India whose position was
Ser than tnat of anyone else; he was the architect of a new in-
dependent movement i.e., the achievement of freedom by non-
violence a noval concept in a world riven by strife and abounding
in violence war and aggression. He was both a saint and a poli-
tician He was assassinated on January 30, 1948 while he was going
to his daily prayer meeting at about 5 p.m. m the grounds of the
Birla Hous Y e by revolver shots fired by Nathuram Godse who was
arrested at the spot. Previous to the murder, a young Punjabi re-
?ugee Madanlal Pahwa, had burst a bomb at the back of Btfla
House damaging a wall and was arrested. In connection with that
. "he ^eM Police were carrying on investigation, and that offence
was found to be in pursuance of the conspiracy to murder Gandhrji.

5 2 In connection with both these offences, eight persons were
arrested and put on trial, and the facts of the conspiracy with its
object of murdering Mahatma Gandhi are clearly set out m the
iudkment of the learned trial judge, dated February 10, 1949, <md
he judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court of East Punjab
dated June 21, 1949. It is not necessary to repeat them here ex-
cept to give a short resume of the story preceding the murder.

Conspirators — movements of

Story unfolded in the judgments of courts

5 3 The story which the prosecution unfolded at the trial of the
accused in the Gandhi Murder Conspiracy case sufficiently sets out
the incidents which happened before the two occurrences i.e., the
exploding of a gun cotton slab and the assassination of Ganahru
which formed the bases of accusation against the accused in that
case. The accused in that case were :—

(1) Nathuram Godse, aged about 37.

(2) Narain Apte, aged about 34.

(3) Vishnu Karkare, aged about 38.

(4) Madanlal Pahwa, aged about 20.

(5) Shankar Kishtayya, aged about 20.

(6) Gopal Godse, aged about 27.

(7) V. D. Savarkar, aged about 66.

(8) D. S. Parchure, aged about 47.

55

56

Of these, Nathuram Godse and N. D. Apte were respectively editor
: and manager of the newspaper, the Hindu Rashtra published in
,t-oona Previously it was published under the name of the Aerani
but when action was taken against it under the Press Emergency
Powers Act, it ceased publication and restarted under its new name
According to the judgment of the trial court, they were close as-
sociates and members of the Hindu Mahasabha with identical views
and the evidence before the Commission is to the same effect They
were botn sentenced to death and their sentences were upheld by
15 1949 rt 3nd th6y W6re ultimatel y executed on November

5,4 V. R. Karkare belonged to Ahmednagar. He owned a hotel the
Sm £ U6St H ^ S f' ther ?" * He was also a Hindu Mahasabhaite and
W £l T an ! ^° d i e f nd , Ap , te had known him for a considerable
I ™' -d • u ad 1 / entlca l Political leanings. Madanlal Pahwa was
a young Punjabi refugee who had come into contact with and under
the influence of V. R Karkare and through him he came info con-
tact with Nathuram Godse and Apte. Badge was a man of ordi-
nary status. He belonged to Gondhali caste of bards who specialise

^nn7 0tl p nal mUSk , He WaS runnin S a shastra bhan dar (an arms
shop) m Poona and was trafficking in arms, ammunitions and ex-

in SSV.^T alS ° \ HindU Mahasabha "e. He had been helped
m starting his business by many persons, including Mr G V Kat

r 3 n r ^rr n f S N °- k ^ hankar Kishtayya' was a servant of Badge
Gopal Godse was the brother of Nathuram Godse and V D Savar-'
kar was. a well-known revolutionary leader who had distLmshed
himself in his violent anti-British activities and had come into nro
minence after his escape from a British ship in a French port He
later became a Hindu Mahasabhaite—its President-and wa c 1

Sabt leader a^Gwalio^T ° f that ^ ParChu?e ^a Hindu
fn that town Gwahor; he was a medical practitioner and resided

5.5 Of the accused, Madanlal threw a bomb or isniteH * mm

the T o ab lnd Bl [ a ] i0US ? ? n JanUary 20 > 1948 - He wS aSestel at"
the spot. And 10 days later, i.e., on January 30, 1948 Nathuram
Godse fired three shots at Mahatma Gandhi from a close r-iSl 3

ME^cT The m a U i dere J ° f ^ Maha ^ a He at ^atfrrS"
„L * p , Tlle a , KUS «I "ere prosecuted for murder ami em

own duties and investigation ir>tn w*^ +u • ^ \ a amtI0n to his

57

5.7 D. E. Badge who turned an approver was arrested at Poona
•on January 31, 1948. D. S. Parchure was first ordered to be detain-
ed and kept as a detenu at Gwalior as from February 3, 1948 and
was put under arrest for the offence of conspiracy etc on February
17, 1948. Gopal Godse was arrested while on his way to his native
village Uksan in Poona District on February 5, 1948. Savarkar was
taken into custody and detained as from February 5, 1948 and was
put under arrest in the case on March 11, 1948. Shankar Kishtayya
was arrested at Bhuleshehar near the residence of Dikshitji Maharaj
and Dadaji Maharaj in Bombay on February 6, 1948. N. D. Apte
and Karkare were arrested at Pyrkes Apollo Hotel at Bombay on
February 14, 1948. Nathuram Godse was arrested at the spot and
Miadanlal had already been arrested on January 20, 1948, soon after
lie exploded the "bomb". There were three other persons who
were alleged to be in the conspiracy— Gangadhar Dandwade, Gan-
gadhar Yadav and Suryadeo Sharma— but they were absconding and
successfully evaded arrest.

5.8 Vishnu R. Karkare was a kind of a hotelier at Ahmednagar.
Madanlal was a refugee from Pakpattan Tehsil of Montgomery Dis-
trict and was residing after the Partition at the refugee camp at
Visapur about 20 miles away from Ahmednagar. Gopal Godse is
the brother of Nathuram Godse and was a Government servant and
at the time of his arrest was employed in the Motor Transport
Spares Depot at Kirkee. Shankar was the servant of Badge and
used to prepare handles for daggers manufactured by Badge D S-
Parchure was a medical practitioner in Gwalior. Badge, the ap-
prover, ^ who was of Gondhli caste, belonged to Chalisgaon but had
.settled in Poona and was at one time associated with one Mr Atre
the leader of the Congress Party, and was employed in the local
municipality. After he was discharged from there, he was em.
ployed by Mr. G. V. Ketkar, witness No. 1, for collecting funds for
the Hindu Anath Ashram and Hindu Sangathan Samiti with which
Mr. Ketkar was intimately connected.

5.9 The story of the prosecution was that a conspiracy to murder
Mahatma Gandhi was entered into sometime in December 1947 and
Parchure, it was alleged, joined the conspiracy on January 27 1948
In furtherance of the object of the conspiracy, Badge and Shankar
brought two gun-cotton slabs and five hand-grenades with primers
find detonators to Bombay on the evening of January 14 1948 which
were kept at the residence of Dikshitji Maharaj with k servant of
us. Apte and Nathuram Godse arrived at Bombay the same even-
ing, and went to the house of Dikshitji Maharaj with Badge to
procure a revolver from him but could not get one. Karkarl and
Madanlal had arrived in Bombay sometime earlier and were stav-
ing in Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan where Badge and Shankar also
Stayed. . On the 15th the explosives kept at the house of Dikshitji

raraj were taken over by Karkare and Madanlal and were
brought to Delhi the same evening tied up in a bedding. Bad£e and
Nathuram Godse returned to Poona-Badge in order to make ar-
rangements about his bttandar and Nathuram to fetch his brother
;opal Godse who had promised to provide him with a revSver

■ and r S fu nk i a ^i5 et H5 B tf t( > Bomba y reaching there early on the
.uurnmg ui the 17th. Evidently, A]rto mid Nathuram Godse were

58

also in Bombay and they collected some money for expenses re-
quired to carry out their plot. Nathuram Godse and Apte left by
plane on the afternoon of the 17th arriving at Delhi in the evening;
and stayed at the Marina Hotel, then a fairly posh European style
hotel in Connaught Circus. Madanlal and Karkare had arrived the
same day at about -12.30 p.m. and not being able to get accommoda-
tion at the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan stayed at the Shariff Hotel.
Badge and Shankar arrived at Delhi on the evening of the 19th and
stayed at the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan. Gopal Godse arrived at
Delhi sometime after 17th January. One account was that he arriv-
ed on the evening of 18th January and met the others on 19th Jan-
uary. He also stayed at Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan. Thus, Badge,
Shankar, Gopal Godse and Madanlal stayed at the Hindu Maha-
sabha Bhawan for the night. Apte and Badge and Shankar went
to the Birla House on the morning of the 20th and made a survey
of the prayer ground and the back of the servants quarters and
then returned to Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan. In the jungle behind
the Bhawan they tried out the two revolvers that they had brought
but they were found to be unserviceable.

5.10 Thereafter they all met at the Marina Hotel in Nathuram's
room and the plan for the evening was finalised which was that
Madanlal should explode the gun-cotton slab at the back of the
Birla House in order to create a commotion and taking advantage
of the panic thus caused, Badge and Shankar would fire at Mahatma
Gandhi with the two revolvers and would also throw at him a hand-
grenade each. Badge was to fire the revolver and throw a hand-
grenade from the trellis work of the window of the room in the
servants quarter immediately behind where Mahatmaji used to sit
at the time of the prayers. He was to enter the room posing as a
photographer with the object of taking a photograph of the prayer
meeting. Gopal Godse, Madanlal and Karkare were to throw the
remaining hand-grenades on Mahatmaji at the same time. Apte
and Nathuram were to give signals for the various participants to
carry out their respective and assigned parts. In pursuance of this
plan, the gun-cotton slab and a hand-grenade were given to Madan-
lal, one hand-grenade and revolver to Badge, one hand-grenade
each to Gopal Godse and Karkare. The conspirators then left the
Marina Hotel for Birla House, Madanlal and Karkare first, all the ]
others excepting Nathuram Godse a little later in a taxi. Nathu-
ram was to follow them. It is not necessary to give the rest of the
story except to say that Madanlal ignited the gun-cotton slab on
the wall near the back gate of Birla House but the others did not
carry out their respective assigned parts and Nathuram Godse, Apte
and Gopal Godse left immediately in the taxi by which they had
come. Madanlal was arrested at the spot; Karkare, Badge and
Shankar managed to escape.

5.11 While Nathuram Godse and Apte were in Bombay they had
unsuccessfully tried to get a pistol from Dadaji Maharaj and Dixit*
ji Maharaj. From Delhi they went to Gwalior arriving at 10.30 p.m.
on 27th January and stayed the night and the day following with
Dr. Parchure to whom they disclosed their plan and with his help
and with of Dandwate the absconding accused they were able to
get a pistol from one Goel. Leaving Gwalior the same night they

(i) Ex. 270 A— Pistol used by assassin Nathuram Godse.
[Para. No. 5.11]

■

(ii) Ex. 270 C— Another picture of the pistol.
fPara. No. 5,21]

59

arrived at Delhi the next morning where they were joined by Kar-
I re and three of them spent the night in the retiring room at the
Mm Main Railway Station. The next evening, i.e., on the 30th.
lanuaiy? Nathura^Godse shot Mahatmaji dead and was arrested
lit the spot. Two photographs of the assassin's pistol (Court Ex..
39) are attched herewith. (See next page).

5.12 The Commission has got two documents Prepared which,
show the movement of the accused from January 9, 1948 lhey
also s't out the evidence in support of the movements indicated..
(See Exhibit 276 and Exhibit 276-A).

513 It thus shows that the conspirators moved about from place
l,> nlace The principal ones amongst them were staying at betlei
da^Si bette/known hotels like tie Marina .Hotel New Delh^and
the Elphinstone Annexe Hotel Bombay and after the incident o l the
20th they managed to escape by tram-two to Poona and the pr m-
cipal accused, i.e., Nathuram Godse and Apte to Kanpur en route.
to Bombay. Karkare and Gopal Godse stayed the night in Delhi
at the Frontier Hotel in Chandni Chowk and one left the following
day and the other later. As far as the court record goes, it does
not show that the conspirators were hidding themselves anywhere
and beyond adopting pseudonyms they do not seem to have attempt-
ed to hide themselves.

514 On return to Bombay on January 23, Apte stayed at the
Arya Pathik Ashram, Bombay, under an assumed name of D. Nara--
yan and so did Nathuram Godse. Thereafter Nathuram Godse and.
Apte stayed in the Elphinstone Annexe Hotel from January 24,
1948— Nathuram Godse stayed under an assumed name of Vma-
yakrao. Apte spent the night between the 24th and 25th January
1948 with a woman in the Arya Pathik Ashram and then shifted
to Elphinstone Annexe Hotel where they (Apte and Gcdse) stayed
npto January 27, 1948. On the morning of January 25, Naihuram
Godse and Apte went to the Air India office and got two seats re-
served in the names of Narayanrao and Vinayakrao by the plane
leaving on the 27th January. The four of them— Nathuram Godse,
Gopal Godse, Apte and Karkare— met at the house of G. M. Josm
of the Shivaii Printing Press at Thana and conferred together xhere
which really meant that they discussed their future plan to carry
out the object of the conspiracy.

5.15 On January 26, 1948, in the morning, Nathuram Godse and
Apte met Dadaji Maharaj and Dixit] i Maharaj and asked their help
to get a revolver but they did not succeed in getting one. On Jan-
uary 27, 1948, both of them left Bombay for Delhi by air. It is alleg-
ed that on the eve of their departure for Delhi the two principal
conspirators, Godse and Apte, saw Savarkar but that is controver-
sial. The rest of their movements, i.e., their reaching Delhi, pro-
ceeding to Gwalior, staying there with Dr. Parchure and getting a
revolver through him and returning to Delhi on the 29th January
1948 and staying irr a retiring room at the Delhi Railway Station
have already been set out above. On January 30, 1948, at 5 P.M.,
N;ithnram Godse carried QVA '■■■■■■ object of the conspiracy, firing three
■hots •■:! point blank range and -thus killing Mahatma Gandhi.

60

Tr^;! 6 fit Comm i ssion thus has a complete picture of the move,

ITS? i fi hr°u D To r ?i 0rS t fr0m , the time ^ left Poona on January
id ly^a, ngnt upio the time they were arrested on various dxiJ

\uZTn n ?£ eSSa 7 1° pUrsue the course ° f the trial before the Special
Judge, Delhi and the appeal before the East Punjab ffigh Court h ut

Sf Pr fa 5 re ™ amS !^ at th , ese P ersons af ter the arres ^of Sadanla' and
after the information which had been given by Professor Sir , ™ ™£
moving about in Bombay and in Delhi and othei ^facS an neS
their names nor their identities could be discovered The S

in°sp te'fTSuous 1 Tn ?*?*? ^ ^ and held that" this^ls

'f^lle^^aSd^th?^^ 1 ? ° rder " d t0 ^ t7an r sport e e X d
te ParchuS SHL V V^ C ° Urt ' two more wer ' e acquitted,
•i.e., .raicnuie and Shankar Kishtayya. The anneal nf +h* vL+ J

the accused persons was dismissed? the sentences of death on N^h^
ram Godse and Apte were confirmed unde ■ s 374 C PC P w t^"
sentences passed on the other three were upheld. 6

Noven?ber^ h 5 U 1SQ GO Tt and + Apte T re hanged in Ambal * &* on

in fflSr fails Af^tmf^A™ kep } in Punjab Jail * and then

they Successfullv n?™5 y & S6rved a Certain number of years
uicy uubuccessimiy moved, on more occasions ^.n rm Q +u o

were released Bomba y- Th e fact remains that these persons

m^tehon, were sent out on a post card, Ex. 29, under he name of
tranifatton 2£S ^TSSSSS &3SSSWfi£S£

SHRI GAJANAN PRASANNA
(i.e., May Lord Ganpati bless)
With respect of love—

^ ruja and u.n,.i ..I ..ii.,i,- n„,,, by inviting ii„,,, here: You are

61

therefore requested to remain present for this ceremony along with,
your friends.

Yours,
i.

M. G. GHAISAS.

Time— Thursday 12-11-1964 5*30 P.M. to 7'3° P.M. Place Udyan Kar>alaya 3 619
Shaniwar Path, Poona - 2.

5.20 It is significant to note that in this invitation Nathuram
Godse was described as 'Deshbhakt', i.e., a patriot which is demons-
trative of the mentality of the organisers of the function and it
may not be too remote an inference that the invitees would be sym-
pathetic if not holding the same or similar views. The affidavit
iiled in the Bombay High Court by M. C. Ghaisas, who was also
detained as a consequence of the function, shows that about 50 in-
vitations were sent. Actually the attendance was about 3 or 4 times,
that number. It has variously been described as 125 to 200.

5.21 In the issue of the Indian Express dated the 14th November

. 1964, Ex. 26, under the caption "POONA EDITOR KNEW OF THE
PLAN TO MURDER MAHATMA GANDHI", there was a report of'
the proceedings of this function by its Poona Correspondent to the
effect that Mr. G. V. Ketkar, former editor of the Keswri and at that
time editor of the Tarun Bharat presided at the junction and the
occasion was described as a reception in the newspaper which in-
deed it was and was given in honour of Gopal Godse and Vishnu
Karkare Mr. G. V. Ketk'ar there made a speech in which he said
that he knew from Nathuram Godse assassin of Gandhiji of thr-
u plan" to murder Gandhiji quite a "few weeks earlier" but' he was
opposed to Nathuram's idea. The proceedings of the function which
may be termed a puj a or a meeting shows that Gopal Godse and
ivarkare narrated their jail experiences. The following extract
from the newspaper The Indian Express, Bombay, shows "what ex-
actly Mr. Ketkar said :—

"Mr. Ketkar presided over the function, which was held in
Udyan Mangal Karyalaya. It was attended by about 100 men
and women.

"Mr. Ketkar disclosed that for about three months prior to
Gandhiji's murder, Nathuram 'used to discuss with me the pros
and cons of his idea to kill Gandhiji. He was opposed to
the idea and 'used to tell Nathuram to consider the conse-
quences, both social and political'.

"Mr. Ketkar said that after the first incident (Madan Lai
had exploded a bomb at Gandhiji's prayer meeting a few days-
before the murder), Badge (who turned approve?) had com
to Poona and told him (Mr. Ketkar) of 'their future plans 7 .

to Mlf GiSSjL addGd that he thUS kneW that they Were goin ^

"As Mr. Ketkar said these things, Mr. Gopal Godse asked'
him not to speak 'more about it'. But Mr. Ke to^fSJ
'they will not arrest me now for that' » d

62

5.22 Ex, 27B is a report of the proceedings as given in the Times
=p| India dated 16th November 1964 which is a little more informative.
Therein it is said that Mr. Ketkar recently asserted that he had
-advance information about Nathuram Godse's intention to assassinate
Mahatma Gandhi, and told the Times of India News Service, that he
had informed the late Balukaka Kanitkar about Godse's intention
to murder Mahatma Gandhi and that Kanitkar had written to
Mr. Kher but the State Government did not act on the information
received. Ketkar also said that he tried to dissuade Nathuram
Godse from doing bodily harm to Gandhiji. Mr. Ketkar further
■disclosed that Nathuram Godse, had in a public speech, said that he
would like to see how Mahatma Gandhi would realise his wish of
living upto 125 years. This disclosure about the advance informa-
tion was condemned by the Poona City District Congress Committee
as a dangerous trend which was harmful to the State. The President ]
of the D.C.C., Mr. B. N. Sanas, drew the attention of the State Gov-
ernment to Mr. Ketkar's statement and he alsq wanted the Govern-
ment to take note of the fact that those who had been sentenced in
the Mahatma Gandhi Murder case were felicitated by certain persons
in Poona on their release from prison.

5.23 When the Indian Express report appeared in its issue dated
.November 14, 1964, Mr. G. V. Ketkar issued a clarification which is
as revealing as hi s previous speech. This is Ex. 27A 9 and appeared in
the Indian Express of November 17, 1964. He confirmed the news
being given to the then Premier Mr. B. G. Kher through the late
Balukaka Kanitkar to whom Mr. Ketkar had conveyed Nathuram's
intention to kill Gandhiji. He further said that the report i s the
previous issue of the Indian Express was "generally correct" but the
objection that Ketkar took to the report was in regard to the use of
the words "plan to kill Gandhiji". The clarification was in the
■following words: —

"In his 'clarification', Mr. Ketkar said that what Nathuram
had told him was his 'intention 5 to kill Gandhiji and not his
'plan' to murder Gandhiji."

* * * # .j.

"I stated in my closing remarks that after Nathuram Godse
had disclosed to me some months before (Gandhiii's murder)
his intention of murdering Gandhiji I had tried to dissuade him
on political, social and moral grounds.

"Published reports of that speech are generally correct 1
had spoken about it (Nathuram's intention) to the late Ba^u-
SH ^ amtkar - He (Kanitkar) had then written to the then
Chief Minister. B G. Kher, informing him NathuraU intS
uon. Kanitkar had shown me a copy of that letter (to Kher).

"Since I expressed opposition to Nathuram Godse he did
not speak to me about the matter., Hence I had nS come to
know m advance his actual plan."

I 5 ' 2 t/ n * h e sa ™ e iss ? e > the Indian Express adversely commented
upon Mr. Ketkar's conduct. It said that Ketkar's foreLioXdS of
the assassination of Mahatmn Gandhi only added to the JiySy of

63

the circumstances preceding the crime. In other words, the Poon^
Editor had information from Godse himself of the assassin's Inten-
tion' and not of his 'plan'. This subtle difference does not greatly
alter the patent fact that Mr. Ketkar, as a responsible citizen, had a
clear obligation to prevent the assassination as far as it lay in his
power. It also said that it was the duty of the Government to come
►out with the facts in fairness to the Poona editor. The paper
added —

"But the story would not end there. Even if Mr. Ketkar
is cleared by an official confirmation of his claim, a further
explanation would still be required of those who last week
made such a show of Godse's 'martyrdom'. The Poona 'recep-
tion' for the assassin's two accomplices was a sordid reminder
of the ugly spirit which still moves some people in this country.
Have we really fallen so low that not only the murderer of the
Father of the Nation but also those who, in the eyes of the
law, helped him in his heinous act are to be regarded as
national heroes? The Poona 'reception' was a shame beyond
description. There can be n two opinions about it."

5.25 The Poona Daily News also published a report cf Ketkar's
clarification in its issue of 16th November, 1964, Ex. 28. There the
clarification is different. A reference is made by Mr. Ketkar to the
speech of Nathuram Godse at a meeting mentioning about Gandhiji's
utterances of living upto 125 years and then he mentioned his having
a talk with Balukaka Kanitkar about this intention of Nathuram
Godse and it was Balukaka Kanitkar who had "relayed" the fact to
Mr. B. G. Kher. Further, it is asserted that everything to avoid this
calamity was thus done "when I told Nathuram that it is wrong way
to behave in the politics and it would have grave and misdirected
repercussions."

5.26 Ex. 182 dated November 24, 1964, is a letter from the District
Magistrate to the Government of Bombay regarding reaction to the
disclosure made by G. V. Ketkar. Poona City, it said, was stirred
l>y Ketkar's statement and the subsequent functions to celebrate the
death anniversary of Nathuram and the situation had become tense
l»i 1 1; because of the intervention of the leaders of political parties ^o
mishap took place.

5.27. By an order dated November 24, 1964, the District Magistrate
Poona, ordered the detention amongst others of G. V. Ketkar." It will
he relevant to note at this stage that after the comments in the
Indian Express and before the passing of the order of detention on
November 23,, 1964, Mr. Ketkar left Poona and fled to Madras on
Mlh November. On November 25, 1964, he surrendered himself
More the Commissioner of Police at Madras. He was then brought
l aCK to -Poona and on the way when the train was within the
boundaries of the Maharashtra State, the order of detention was
Nrved on him at midnight and he was first detained in Poona
I ervada Jail and then in *'Akola District Prison".

I After his detention he put in a petition, Ex. 18, to the Review-
wilhority under the Defence of -India Rules, wherein he denied

64

the allegations which had been made against him in the Indiari
Express report and he tried to meet the inference which the com-
ments in that newspapers had drawn. He stated therein that he-
met Balukaka Kanitkar and conveyed to him Nathuram's public
speech and his corroborative private talk with him (Ketkar) and he
urged on Balukaka t communicate the fact to the authorities and
that Balukaka had done so. He also stated therein that "shocking
confession was nothing new and that he had disclosed it earlier to-
Mr. K. K. Khadilkar who is now the Deputy Speaker of the Lower
K'wt?^ examined before this Commission at witness.
No 97 but he had no recollection of any such talk. It is difficult to
imagine that if there had been any such talk, it could have been
forgotten.

iJl'l 9 Evidently there were interpellations in the Maharashtra Legis-
lative Assembly on February 25, 1965 in regard to the reception in
M°Sn r ^} G ° dse 1 and Karkare who had been convicted in the
Mahatma Gandhi Murder case. According to Mr. Ketkar himself
there was a furore in the public press and as a consequence he

botfHo^f o°f r p re r to b f de i ain f d - There was also an q uproarTn

In tt, P H Sn?f Payment and indignant speeches were made there.

LrdSl t tateS / hei ]T a Callin § Attention Motion in

"Plan" o? Nath ir.^r H m f 6 by Ml > G " V " Ketkar regarding the
tt nr* r athuram G °dse to assassinate Mahatma Gandhi Th^

Home Minister, Mr. Gulzari Lai Nanda, in his speech said that ",t a
meeting to felicitate Gopal Godse and Vishnu Karkar Mr Ket>ar

^o -tssTnlte Mi^ had ^°T- ° f the intention of Nathuram Codse
to thflat?^^ r T^ Ga + n v, dhl "FiW «> nveyBd this ^formation
BafSaka a nd Mr kS " r ° U f h ? al " kaka Kanitkar; that as both
t^e^ -s makffig 1

consultation with the Government of Maharashtra dS

v. Q 3 30 F- r - A *?• Mani asked the Home Minister whether he hJ
reSeltotSladT/ 1 " ^r^ hapPened at ^ ^etffig ard

who was an "accessory before the act" against a person

said'Lf^^^hS^^ri? 6 a sp r ted ^ eech *J

(1) disclosures abo^uLplan " mS^haS gS^ 066 ^ 1
by Mr. Ketkar, and (2) the oraaSSSn nf ?u Gandhl Y ere raade '
further said that at thi rt™ * * nisation of the reception itself. He

people had a Slfng ^hat There Sh^T °i M 1 ahatma Gand l
somewhere and that h? h a $Tw £ SOme derel iction of duty

should have Seen glen 4 saidf- *** the P rotecti °n which bl

the whl St i^r^I^WjPowe^d enquiry into
whether and in what mam£r ?f n . m / de in or <3er to find out

65

Mr. Ketkar, what he did later on, to whom he sent, and so on?
I think that if it had been so much talked about at that time,
the would-be murderer coming and talking to Mr. Ketkar, it is
tantamount to an admission that the matter had been discussed
in a conspiratorial manner amongst others also. What was the
Bombay Government doing at that time? We would like to
know whether the Bombay Government and the Central Gov-
ernment and the Central Intelligence had any inkling or indi-
cation with regard to such things. This is very very
important."

He added that he would suggest that because there was a deliberate
.dereliction of duty on the part of some people in high authority who
iu<! got information through Mr. G. V. Ketkar directly or indirectly,
be would suggest that a high-powered enquiry be held into the whole
"utter. He ended his speech by saying: —

"I should like to know whether they, after having failed
to protect Mahatma Gandhi's "life, are today going to allow
these kinds of things. All these things have to be explained."

5.32 Another Member, Mr. Thengari, wanted to know whether the
Government were forewarned by Mr. Balukaka Kanitkar who had
Urged it to take precautions.

5.33 Professor M. B. Lai said the fact that Ketkar presided over
foe meeting indicates that he was not so innocent as he tried to show
himself to be and that he had written a number of articles inciting
hatred against Mahatma Gandhi. Many other Members expressed
Hicir feeling of disgust at the hideous glorification of such murders
like the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. It was under these cir-
"n nstances that this Commission of Inquiry was set up by the
Central Government.

5.34 The Commission has appended to this portion a copy of the
I'.irliamentary Debates which show how the Members of Parliament

cted to the revelations made by Mr. Ketkar. Appendix II.

6.35 In pursuance of these debates the Central Government by a
ROti f 'cation dated March 22, 1965, appointed a Commission of Inquiry
fcr the purposes of making an inquiry into the matters of public
importance therein specified and the terms of reference were: —

(a) Whether any persons, in particular Shri Gajanan Viswanath
Ketkar, ot Poona, had prior information of the conspiracy

of Nathuram Vinayak Godse and others to assassinate
Mahatma Gandhi:

(b) whether any of such persons had communicated the said
information to any authorities of the Government of Bom-
bay or of the government of India; in particular, whether

he aforesaid Shri Ketkar had conveyed the said informa-
tion to the late Bal Gangadhar Kher, the then Premier of
Bombay, through the late Balukaka Kanitkar;

66

(c) if so, what action was taken by the Government of Bomba y,
in particular by the late Bal Gangadhar Kher, and the
Government of India on the basis of the said information. J

Mr. Gopal Swarup Pathak, M.P., a Senior Advocate of the Supreme
Court was appointed to make the inquiry. On his being appointed
a Central Minister and then Governor of the State of Mysore, this
Commission was reconstituted and I was appointed to conduct the
inquiry. That is how this Commission of Inquiry came to be
constituted.

5.36 The terms of reference were amended by notification No.
31/28/68-Pol.I(A) dated October 28, 1968, and in clause (c) the words

"and by the officers of the said Governments" were added with*
retrospective effect so that the third clause now reads as under:— <

(c) If so, what action was taken by the Government of
Bombay, in particular by the late Bal Gangadhar Kher,
and the Government of India and by the officers of the
said Governments on the basis of the said information.

5.37 The first term, i.e., (a), refers particularly to Mr. Ketkar of
Poona and whether he or any other person had prior information of
the conspiracy of Nathuram Godse and others to assassinate Mahatma
Gandhi.

5.38 The second term refers to any communication by such per-
sons, as are mentioned in the first term, of the information to the
Government of Bombay or the Government of India and in particu-
lar whether Mr. Ketkar had conveyed this information through
Balukaka Kanitkar to the late Balasahib Kher.

5.39 And the third term refers to the action taken by one or the
other or both the Governments or any of the officers of the said two!
Governments.

5.40 Clause (b) is wide enough to cover not only the Government \
of Bombay and the Government of India but also any of the autho-
rities of those Governments which would include various officers
under the Governments including those belonging to the police and
civil administration.

5.41 Now the first term uses the words "had prior information of
the conspiracy of Nathuram Vinayak Godse and others to assassinate
Mahatma Gandhi" and the use of the word "conspiracy" in the con-
text, it is submitted, perhaps not unjustifiably, is significant and
important. Is the Commission confined to the prior knowledge of
"conspiracy" as it is defined under section 120A of the Indian Penal
Code or does it refer to the general danger to Mahatma Gandhi's
life from a group of persons which would include Nathuram Godse
as their mentor. The danger could have been from other persons
also as was suggested by Mr. Morarji Desai in his evidontv before the
Commission or was initial at, by Gopal Godse, witnesi No 33

67

5.42 Both the trial court which tried the Gandhi Murder Con-
spiracy case and the High Court to which the appeal was taken after
the conviction, have given their findings as to when the conspiracy
came into existence. According to the judgment of the Special
Judge Mr. Atma Chgiran, existence of the conspiracy could be deduced
at least on January 9, 1948. The learned judge has said: —

"There is no evidence forthcoming on behalf of the prose-
cution as to when the 'conspiracy' was first entered into and
by whom and where. However, it may safely be inferred from
the "movements of the accused and their conduct that the
'conspiracy' was in .existence at least on 9th January 1948 when
Narayan D. Apte sent Vishnu R. Karkare and Madanlal K.
Pahwa along with two more individuals to examine the 'stuff'
at the house of Digambar R. Badge, Narayan D. Apte, Vishnu
R. Karkare and v Madanlal K. Pahwa must have been in the
'conspiracy' at that time. Nathuram V. Godse comes in the
picture first on 10th January 1948 when he along with Narayan
D. Apte asked Digambar R. Badge to be supplied with two
gun-cotton-slabs and five hand-grenades. Nathuram V. Godse
must have been in the 'conspiracy' at that time. Digambar R.
Badge joined the 'conspiracy' on 15th January 1948 when he
agreed to accompany Nathuram V. Godse and Narayan D. Apte
to Delhi. Gopal V. Godse must have been in the 'conspiracy'
on 14th January 1948 when he put in an application for seven
days' casual leave. Shankar Kistayyaa joined the 'conspiracy'
on 20th January 1948 when he was told by Digambar R. Badge
the purpose of their visit to the Birla House. Dattatraya S.
Parchure joined the 'conspiracy' on 27th January 1948 when
he agreed to get a pistol procured for Nathuram V. Godse and
Narayan D. Apte."

5.43 The East Punjab High Court accepted this finding regarding
file coming into existence of the conspiracy. There is also the evi-
dence of Gopal Godse, witness No. 33. He
Riade up his mind to finish Gandhiji when
January 13, 1948, his resolve to go on fast.

stated that Nathuram
Gandhiji justified on

5.44 If the scope of the Commission is only to be circumscribed
b the prior knowledge regarding "conspiracy" then any information
Ret anybody might have had in regard to the danger to the life of
Mahatma Gandhi from individual persons in Poona or wherever they
Might be would be excluded from the scope of the Inquiry unless
thi re is proof "of .their agreeing to do an illegal act" or they had
* Mauled together or formed a plot to do so. In S. 120A. the word
Criminal conspiracy' is defined as follows: —

k S. 120A. When two or more persons agree to do,
be done, —

or cause to

(1) an illegal act. or
tl $) an abt which fj i

ml MhM'al

■d I

illegal means,

( * I i n 1 1 1 ) ; 1 1 con:

63

Provided that no agreement except an agreement to
commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy \
unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or'
more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.

_ Explanation.— It is immaterial whether the illegal aS
is the ultimate object of such agreement or is merely
incidental to that object." J

5.45 Conspiracy, according to the Shorter Oxford English Diction-!
ary, means a combination of persons for an evil or unlawful purpose-
an agreement between two or more to do something criminal, illegal
or reprehensible; a plot. 5 "n"«*i, i^egai,

5.46 In Webster's Third International Dictionary the meaning is]
as follows: —

Conspiracy: 1; (a) an illegal, treasonable, or trecherous plan
to harm or destory another person, group, or entity;
(b) an agreement manifesting itself in words or deeds and j
made by two or more persons confederating to do an
unlawful act or use unlawful means to do an act which is
lawful: Confederacy 2. a combination of persons banded
secretly together and resolved to accomplish an evil or
unlawful end: 3. a striking concurrence of tendencies,
circumstances, or phenomena as though in planned accord.

5.47 In the notification, the word used in clause (a) is 'conspiracy'
which is a term of art and when used in legal documents must
ordinarily connote the meaning given to it in the law relating to
conspiracies as contained in the Indian Penal Code. And in this
case, the conspiracy is specified as being a conspiracy of Nathuram
Oodse and others to assassinate Mahatma Gandhi. Even according
to its dictionary meaning, conspiracy is a combination for unlawful
purposes; a plot, and is connected with something illegal.

ioJ* 4 u S S Y^ w T ed J nd so considered, anything disclosed in Julyl
1947 by Balukaka Kanitkar or Mr. Ketkar or both of them indivi-
dually or collectively, even if it was of a definite kind, would bei
excluded as there was no conspiracy of Nathuram Godse then.

5.49 If the scope of the Inquiry is confined to the knowledge of
conspiracy technically so called, in the Penal Code or its meaning
as given in dictionaries and if the conspiracy came into existence
sometime on the 9th of January 1948 or thereabout or even in Nov-
ember 1947 then any inquiry into any knowledge or information in
possession of Mr. G. V. Ketkar or anyone else before that date would
be dehors the terms of reference in the , notification and any inquiry
by this Commission constituted under that notification with that
limited mandate would be barred.

5.50 In both its legal sense and in its non-legal sense the word
'conspiracy' has reference to a combination or banding together. And
therefore if one wore i<> p[ivo to this wonl the le/fnl meaning of
S I150A Imlt.m renal Code or Hie ordinary con noln lion ol bunding

69

Lner then unless G. V. Ketkar's or other evidence refers to such
Jolting of which the architect was Nathuram Godse, the scope of
Hh Commission's Inquiry will be extremely constricted and narrow.

IJ.51 If on the other hand the word 'conspiracy' is not given its
tedmical meaning then anything known or coming to the knowledge
r Messrs. Ketkar or Balukaka Kanitkar individually or to both of
Mum together or to any other individual relating to the intention
ai plan to murder Mahatma Gandhi or relating to a threat or danger
i.» his life would be within the scope of the Inquiry by this Conx-
ion. A plan or intention may be of one person or more than
utK! person acting together but conspiracy can only be between two
or more than two persons. It is not even alleged that information
given by Mr. Ketkar to Balukaka Kanitkar, assuming that it was
i en, was rgearding a conspiracy or banding together of two persons
ii more and therefore if the Commission were to attach to the word
'conspiracy' its technical meaning that information would not be
vilhin the boundaries of the mandate of the Commission of Inquiry
■ i up by the notification. And that would hardly be in conformity
mIIi what the Parliamentary debates disclose or what clearly
appears to be the matter which was agitating the minds of the public
■fleeted in the speeches of the various Honourable Members of
i '.i 1 1 iament, in the Council of States or in the H'ousse of the People.

B 52 If the Commission were to take a technical view of the word-
ing of the notification then prior to 20th January 1948 the only person
■ itiiside the accused persons who had prior knowledge ot the con-
spiracy was Professor Jain and his two friends with whom he held
| Iks about Madanlal's disclosures; and Mr. G. V. Ketkar to whom
nuch a plan was disclosed by D. R. Badge on or about the 23rd
J nnuary 1948. Nobody has even alleged that before January 20, 1948
I'm lessor Jain informal anyone in authority of the existence of
conspiracy or even of the danger to Mahatma Gandhi's life; of
rnurse after January 20, 1948, when Madanlal was arrested and he
mnde a "confessional" statement, the Delhi Police also came to know
.,1 1.1 ie existence of the conspiracy but as to when they came to
know about the identity of the conspirators or the participants m
Mm offence may not be so easy to say or even relevant at this stage.

(5 ,53 Professor Jain's knowledge of the conspiracy to put it in
his own words was this: —

"Then he (Madanlal) said that there was a conspiracy to
murder. I asked, whom do you want to murder. Do you
want to murder me. He said that he did not know who
was to be murdered. I astefed him: "do you want + to
murder Jinnah." H e said: "ho, because Jinnah was^too
well guarded and nothing could be done about him. jL
named Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Then I mentioned
Sardar Patel. He said: "no". From my house I took him
to the sea shore. I tried to draw him out by talking nicely.
Even then he would not give the name. So I put a direct
question as to who the person was that was going to be
murdered. He named Mahatma Gandhi."

70

5.54 It may be added that on the 21st January Professor Jairf
gave this information of the conspiracy to Premier B. G. Kher and
Mr. Morarji Desai and reference may be made to Mr. Morarji Desai's.
statement as PW. 78 in the court of the Special Judge at page 16$
of the High Court record. Even there the word used is not con-
spiracy but what is said is "He (Jain) then said that Madanlal his*

friends had decided to take the life of a great leader Madanlal

then gave the name of Mahatma Gandhi."

5.55 In his statement before the Commission in answer to a.
question regarding conspiracy, Mr. Morarji Desai said: —

"There were rumours that there was a conspiracy going on^
against Gandhiji because of the Partition and of the 55*
crores. I did not hear people saying that there was no
escape for him and his life was in danger. This was about;
the time when he undertook the fast."

So that this also puts the matter in January 1948.

5.56 A Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry
Act is, it has been so held by the Supreme Court, a fact-finding body-
and is not a judicial tribunal in the setnse that that word is used. If r
the word 'conspiracy' and the language of the terms of the notifica-
tion constituting this Commission of Inquiry were to be interpreted
as statutes, statutory orders or legal documents are interpreted, ie. T ,
according to the rules of interpretation! by courts and other judicial
or quasi judicial tribunals, then whatever was said and debated in
Parliament previous to the notification constituting this Commission
may not be relevant for its interpretation and if the word 'conspiracy^
were to be strictly and legally construed, the mandate of Parliament
and its direction for or requirement of collection of facts connected
with Mr. Ketkar or Balukaka Kanitkar and what they said or did'
and what information they gave would not be carried out and the- ]
wishes of Parliament would be thwarted, frustrated and remain
unfulfilled and the debate would become sterile. That would be* J
stultifying the Commission itself and make its setting up thoroughly
futile, useless and inutile if not facetious. That should be prevented
and avoided as far as it is reasonably possible.

5.57 Now two persons are mentioned by name in clauses (a) and
(b) of the notification— G. V. Ketkar and Balukaka Kanitkar. So*
it will be fruitful to discuss at this stage what they disclosed to the* !
authorities if they did disclose anything at all or anything definite..

5.58 The evidence of Mr. G. V. Ketkar does not disclose his know-
ledge of conspiracy prior to January 20, 1948 and in this word.
"evidence" would include his statement as a witness before the Com-
mission; his petition and affidavit to the Bpmbay High Court; petition
to the Detenus Reviewing Board or any other document wmch he
has chosen to place before this Commission. As a matter of fact,
before January 20, 1948, the only person who had prior information
of the conspiracy as such was, as has been said above, Priofessor

Jain, but he, to pUt tt mildly ;hhI <>ven charitably, was sceptical,

71

WO re than once and was readily vaiteWe W BJP. hatever infor .
appear and was always ready and anxious to give
mation he possessed.

5.59 Professor Jain has deposec 1 with regard [^XleTeSS
tl,;it somawhere in early January Mada inlal m » * • ^

,,,,:< returning from the eollege and he . ««« to (J S^g ^

i„ lalk to him and accompanied Jam to ms house Jia Madarl ial
„„.«, watehing from a little dartanea ^J^^ t random »

S 28 and" ProSsor y£*« *£fc3& "|&£C

•sTnd Professor Jain and his colleagues who knew anything
, S the conspScy. Professor Jain's two colleagues and friends
„ equally undecided and sceptical about what Jain told them.

., <;n Tt would be relevant to mention that what Professor Jain
, s friers say thly knew about the conspiracy, must have been
i J wV o Pari amentwhen they debated the statements of Mr. G
V Ketkar because thev had appeared as prosecution witnesses at
L I Hal and ? &# or otherwise of their behaviour and per-
termance was not the basis or the reason or the cause of Mia-
in. 11 In ry debate.

■> 01 The debate in Parliament and the story disclosed by Mr

ar which led to the matter being taken up by Parliament and

„,I,.,II V discussed there does not point to exclusion of Ketkar s

. Z* L IVomH.h- scope of the Inquiry, rather it is a pomter the

hi'? wav Ami II.- Commission Ls of Hi- -pinion that tts mnndnte

„„ ,,„,;.'.' ;„| ,, , ,,, ( .,i,- Into Iho whole matter and discuss

72

the evidence produced before it. It does not propose to circum-
scribe the Inquiry within the narrow limits of the legal connotation
of "conspiracy" or its dictionary meaning which was the matter in
issue at the Gandhi Murder trial.

5.62 The rule of construction of statutes which has been adopted
by courts ever since the Lincoln College Case, 1 and which has uni-
formly been accepted as the proper rule of construction is Exposition
Ex Visceribus Actus, i.e., language of the whole Act has to be looked
at. And the court has to consider any other part of the Act which
throws light on the intention of the Legislature and which may
serve to show that the particular provision ought not to be constru-
ed as it would be< alone and apart from the rest of the Act; in other
words, every clause of a statute should be construed with reference
to the context and other clauses in the Act to make a consistent
enactment of the whole statute. 2

5.63 Thus construed, we have to look at the three terms of refer-
ence, (a), (b) and (c), together and to construe them together. This
rule of construction requires that in order to effectuate the parti-
cularised portion in terms (b) referring to the information given
through Balukaka Kanitkar, we have to add to the words, "con-
spiracy of Nathuram Vinayak Godse and others to assassinate
Mahatma Gandhi", the words "plan or intention to assassinate
Mahatma Gandhi or danger to the life of Mahatma Gandhi or the
threats to his life" as in cases of casus omissus* This is so because
the conspiracy came into existence, according to the findings of the
court, at least on January 9, 1948, and according to the case of the
prosecution in December, 1947. As the letter of Balukaka Kanitkar
was written in July 1947, it could possibly not have referred to any
conspiracy to murder Mahatma Gandhi as technically understood.
It must have reference to intention or plan to assassinate or to any
threat given to the life of Mahatma Gandhi or any danger sensed
against his life. As a matter of fact, Balukaka Kanitkar's letter, so
far as the Commission has been able to see, referred to the life of
Congress leaders, including Mahatma Gandhi.

5.64 In any case, to carry out the intention of Parliament and
to subserve its directions and to give a harmonious interpretation,
it is necessary to construe the words "conspiracy to assassinate" to
include at it were plan or intention to assassinate or danger to the
life of Mahatma Gandhi or threats to his life.

5.65 The Commission, therefore, holds that it is within the scope
of this Inquiry not only to inquire about the knowledge of persons
mentioned in the terms of reference about the conspiracy of Nathu-
ram Godse and others to assassinate Mahatma Gandhi but also to
enquire into any knowledge of plan or intention to kill or threat or
danger to his life.

5.66 The story as disclosed by the eyidence before the Commis-
sion is that sometime in July 1947 Balukaka Kanitkar got some
information in regard to danger to the life of top Congress leaders

i. (1595) 3 Co. Rep. 58b.

%, See Lord Davey in Canada Sngar Refining Go. V. R. (1898) A. C. 73$, 741.

73

which included Mahatma —^sSSffS
B . G. Kher at Delhi. So, if the ^ttena |b||JJ If & case>

what is contained in the second ^o£d be exc iuae ^ fo

to the expression "conspiracy of Nathuram Godse a d ^^
assassinate Mahatma Gandhi the technical mea 8
in the Indian Penal Code is S^^J^J^M^ wiU be left more

will be «^^.^^^^Xatod Godse, Apt,,
or less in the position that the court was. m , « i mu rder

s^^Sw debates " Mch have

been attached as appendix II to this Report.

5.67 In the opinion of the ^S^S^SSSS^^^
too narrow and ^^^^tSc^^hi adopted the
Sfe^eta^^wordr prior Jgjtodj. of .^^2
assassinate" to include prior kawgedge^ E g Sf it the technical
Gandhi's life or threats to his life rather than gwmgi

complied with.

5.69 The first term of reference, (a) , was as follows: —

(*\ Whether any persons, in particular Shri Gajanan Viswa-
( ' nath KetS of Poona, had prior information of the cons-
ptocy of Nathuram Vinayak Godse and others to assassi-
nate Mahatma Gandhi.

When analysed, this term requires finding out—

(i) whether any persons had prior information of the cons-
piracy;
(ii) in particular whether Mr. G. V. Ketkar of Poona had this •

information;
<m the conspiracy which is indicated in the terms of refer-
( ' ence is the one in which the participants were Nathuram
Godse as the principal and also others; and

74

(iv) the object of the conspiracy mentioned was to assassinate
Mahatma Gandhi. ■

5.70 In order to decide the first point, it is necessary to deal with
the statement of Mr. Ketkar himself. He is witness No. 1. It will
next have to be seen whether his statement receives corroboration
from documentary, oral or circumstantial evidence. The Commis-
sion will first discuss the statement of Mr. Ketkar and see how far
his own statement supports the claim that he had prior informa-
tion. (See Chapter XX) .

CHAPTER VI— BACKGROUND 6f THE ACCUSED
Index of Paragraphs

6.2 Godse

6.10 Apte

6.14 Karkare

6.25 Gopal Godse

6.27 Badge

75

CHAPTER VI
Background of the accused

6.1 It will be helpful if the background of the various accused
persons and their movements after the conspiracy was formed are
set out at this stage. These are based on Exhibits 276 and 276-A.

Godse '

6.2 He was one of the originators of the Rashtra Dal which held
its first camp in Poona in May, 1942. On January 16, 1944, he with
Apte decided to start a newspaper and they did start "the Agrani"
on March 1, 1944.

6.3 On January 2 or 3, 1948, Godse and Apte went to Ahmed-
nagar and met Karkare. On January 10 Godse and Apte were pro-
mised by Badge that he would supply them with ammunition,
termed the stuff, at the Hindu Mahasabha office at Bombay. On
January 14, 1948 Godse and Apte met Savarkar. Badge brought the
promised ammunition. Godse, Apte, Badge, and Shankar, went to
the Dixitj i Maharaj and left the ammunition there either with him
or with his servant. It is not quite clear which it was,

6.4 On January 15, 1948, Godse, Apte, Badge, Karkare, and
Madanlal^ held a meeting at the Hindu Mahasabha office and then
went to Dixitj i Maharaj and took from there the ammunition that
they had left there. Karkare and Madanlal were then asked to leave
for Delhi. Godse evidently returned to Poona. Badge also promised
to go to Delhi.

6.5 On January 17, 1948, Godse, Apte, Badge and Shankar saw
Savarkar at his house. Godse and Apte left Bombay for Delhi by
2-00 p.m. plane and arrived at Delhi at 7-30 p.m.
and stayed at the Marina Hotel from the 17th till the
20th January, 1948. On 19th January they saw Badge at the Hindu
Mahasabha office. They also met Ashutosh Lahiri and Dr. Satya
Prakash at the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan. On 20th January, Nathu-
ram Godse, Apte, Karkare, Madanlal, Shankar, Gopal Godse and
Badge met at the Marina Hotel. The same day in the evening,
Madanlal exploded the gun cotton slab at the prayer meeting in the
presence of Nathuram Godse. Godse and Apte fled from there and
hurriedly left the hotel and then left for Kanpur by the night train
where they reached the next morning.

6.6 On the following day, they both stayed at the retiring room
at the Kanpur Railway Station. On 22nd January they left Kanpur
for Bombay by Punjab Mail and arrived at Bombay on 23rd Janu-
ary, They stayed ;i day and a night at the Arya Pathik Ashram and

78

shifted to Elphinstone Hotel Annexe on 24th January. On January
25, Godse and Apte met Karkare and Gopal Godse at Ville Parle.
The same day they booked seats for Delhi in the Air India plane for
27th January under assumed names. On the same day, i.e., 25th,
Godse and Apte obtained a loan of ten thousand rupees from one
Pranjpe, really Bank Silver Company in Bombay. The money was
paid by Pranjpe the next day partly (Rs, 8000-00) by cheque and
partly in cash (Rs. 2000-00) which was supposed to be meant for
the 'Hindu Rashtra'. On January 27, Godse and Apte came to Delhi
by Air and the same afternoon went to Gwalior by the Grand Trunk
Express and stayed with Dr. Parchure. The next day Goel brought
them a revolver which was defective. Then Dandwate brought an-
other revolver which was purchased by Godse for Rs, 300-00. Leav-
ing Gwalior that evening they reached Delhi the next morning i e
29th January, and stayed at the Delhi Main Railway Station in a
retiring room (No. 6) . Karkare also stayed there with them.

6.7 On 17th January, 1948, Godse had got from one Kale one
thousand rupees and at Lalbaug he met Charandas and got a dona- |
lion of five thousand rupees, showing that they were well provided
wiih money. j

6.8 Their movements of the 29th and 30th are important and
therefore, they may be given at some length, Karkare had gone to
Birla Dharmshala in the morning. Godse and Apte met him therp
At about 1-00 p.m. Apte, Godse and Karkare went to the Old Delhi
Railway Station and engaged retiring room No. 6. Godse gave his
name as N. Vinayak Rao. Thereafter Apte, Godse and Karkare
went to the maidan and took some decisions there. At 4-00 pm
all three of them— Apte, Godse and Karkare— went to Birla House
and found about 400 persons attending the prayer meeting They
then returned to Old Delhi Railway Station. Ante and Karkare went
to the pictures at New Delhi. It should have been added that Apte
Godse, and Karkare went some time in the afternoon to the -jungle
behind Birla Mandir and Godse fired three or four rounds with the
pistol and buried handgrenades there. Apte and Karkare returned
from the cinema some time after midnight.

6.9 Now we come to the 30th January, the fateful day. On that
day Apte, Karkare and Godse after having their breakfast at the
Railway Station Restaurant went to Birla Mandir. Godse fired three
or four rounds in the jungle behind Birla Mandir. At 11-30 am
Godse returned to the Old Delhi Railway Station and Karkare went
to the Madras Hotel. Karkare went to Old Delhi Railway Station
and there met Apte and Godse at about 2-00 p.m. At 4-30 pm Ante
Godse and Karkare left Delhi Railway Station by tonga and reached
Birla Mandir. Godse went to Birla Mandir to have darshan of the
deity there. Apte and Karkare then went to Birla House. Godse at
about 5-00 p.m. shot at Mahatma Gandhi and was arrested there

™ a SK- 6 i 00 . 1 P ' M - £ pt + e and Karkare left b ^ t( >nga and returned to
Old Delhi Railway Station.

v.i

6 ,o Apte was e^dently a better educated g^^Mgs B Dal

„, ,,41-42 and then became a ^Sm^^i^ and ° f

.,„,!. at that time had about 50 "Jg^g^ 1 ^ returned to

Khlch Godse was a prominent w ™' b ^ t he obta ined his dis-

., hm ,dnagar and was selected for ^

ltre after about four months and ^^^^^nged the black
. Ar ,ani> in 1944 Hj j w£ §JJ^ con-

demonstration at Panchgani a&"^ 1
rnting to C.R. Formula.

6 .U It is not necessary Jto gc , further ^f ^^3^
On 2nd or 3rd January 1948 ^Pje and Goose « ^^

„„1 met Karkare there C^l the, 13th ^January 1» , P ^

told Badge to deliver the arms and ammunmo j&

ii,, Hindu Mahasabha office m. £°«^y. ' ^ dropped

,te and Godse went to Bombayby^emng^n ana w ^

, ' Savarkar Sadan by one M ^J^^Mo^* Badge, Karkare,
they met Savarkar at 7 - 30 /; M n .^ e ' M ^ai' and left the stuff,

; ;,; e n arm H S o?S. Apte «tad . Badge ^^^^^M',

lu ? elhl -e?VI iTthree of them went to the Bombay Dyeing
Railway Station. All tnree oi uiem w Karkare and

evening of 20th January, 1948.
6.12 On the 18th January, 1948, Karkare met Apte near ^ House

r«^P lAft for Kanpur by the night train after fleeing the Birla

by Punjab Mail and reached Bombay on 23rd evening.

cisr>r> -?l<5t Tanuarv 1948, Apte and Karkare left Delhi by
& noif»S? Sess at 3 30 vm. the former travelled 2nd Class and
4e lattor sXSss On 2nd February, 1948 Apte and Mare
arrived in Bom bay ^d stayed at Sea Green Hotel. On 3rd February,

80

1948, Apte and Karkare went to Klphinstono Annexe Hotel ana
Apte contacted Miss Manorama Salvi. On 5th February, 1948, they
went with G. M. Joshi to Thana. Apte and Karkare went to stay in
Apollo Hotel on 13th February, 1948, and Apte was arrested at
Pyrkes Apollo Hotel at Bombay on 14th February, 1948.

Karkare

6.14 Karkare was a hotel keeper of Ahmednagar and was a pro-
minent member of the Hindu Mahasabha there. He used his
moneys in furtherance of the cause of the Hindu Mahasabha and
in that process he worked amongst the refugees and managed to
attract to himself Madanlal, who made himself notorious in
Ahmednagar by his violent activities against Muslims and against
some Congress leaders like Raosahib Patwardhan. There is evi-
dence to show that in starting his business Karkare got some assist-
ance from N. D. Apte who was a school master in Ahmednagar at
the time.

6.15 He was mentioned by S. V. Ketkar as the person who had
given him arms and ammunition which were found with Ketkar and*
therefore, the hotel and house of Karkare were also searched.
Godse and Apte met him at his hotel on January 2 or 3, 1948. He
left Ahmednagar on January 6, 1948. On the 7th he met Apte at
the 'Agrani' office. On 9th January he introduced Madanlal to
Apte and in the afternoon took Madanlal to Badge's house to see
the 'stuff' meaning arms and ammunition. On the 10th he went to
Bombay and then to Thana to G. M. Joshi's house. On the 11th
he met Madanlal at the Hindu Mahasabha office, Bombay, and then
went to Chembur Camp with him. On 13th he went to see Savarkar
but could not meet him and met him on the following day and intro-
duced Madanlal to him. He then went with Madanlal to Professor
Jam at about 6-00 p.m. On the 15th Apte, Badge and Karkare with
Godse and Madanlal went to Bhuleshwar and met Dixitji Maharaj
and took the 'stuff (arms and ammunition) from Dixitji Maharaj.
Both Madanlal and Karkare left for Delhi by Peshawar Express
and reached Delhi on January 17 along with one Angchekar and
stayed at the Hindu Sharif Hotel. That evening Badge came to
Birla Dharmshala where Karkare met him and they decided to meet
the next morning, i.e., 18th. Karkare met Apte and Godse at -the
Marina Hotel on the morning of the 18th and after having breakfast
he along with Apte and Godse went to New Delhi Railway Station
to meet Gopal Godse but Gopal Godse did not arrive. They then
returned to Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan. At 11-30 a.m. on that day
Godse gave a chit to Karkare for the Secretary, Hindu Mahasabha,
for allotment of a room to him, and, as a consequence, room No 3
was allotted to him. At 3-30 p.m. Apte, Godse and Karkare went
to Birla House and then returned to Marina Hotel. Karkare had his
dinner with Godse and Apte at the Marina Hotel and then went to
New Delhi Railway Station to see if Gopal had arrived, but they did
not find Gopal and they returned to the Marina Hotel for the night
As a matter of fact, Gopal Godse arrived that evening and slept at
the platform. *

ei

6.16 Next morning (on 19th) all three of them visited Birla House
.mm I surveyed the prayer ground. Gopal arrived that day at the
Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan at 11*30 a.m. Karkare and Madanlal re-
in i nod to Sharif Hotel and in the evening they along with Gopal
returned to Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan at about 8-00 p.m. At 9-0O
f ivi. Madanlal and Karkare went to Gole Market and had their
{heals there. The same evening, Apte, Badge, Karkare and Gopal dis-
missed the plan for shooting at a meeting in the forest near Hindu
Mahasabha Bhawan. Apte and Karkare then returned to Marina
Hotel and slept there. Others went to the Hindu Mahasabha
I'hawan. I

6.17 On the 20th, Karkare came to the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan
in the morning. At 12-30 p.m. Karkare and Madanlal left Hindu
Mahasabha Bhawan and went to Birla House and then to Marina
Hotel. Apte had his lunch there and others at the Madras Hotel. All
subsequently met at Marina Hotel and armed themselves with
various weapons. At 4-00 p.m. Madanlal and Karkare went to
Birla House. Karkare and Gopal went and mixed with the congre-
gation. At 4*45 p.m. the bomb was exploded. After the explosion^
Karkare went to Frontier Hindu Hotel and stayed in room No. 2.
Copal Godse also went to the Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan and then
to the Frontier Hindu Hotel and stayed there in room No. 4 under
the name Gopalan.

6.18 On 21st, Karkare visited Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan and Old
Delhi Railway Station. At 9-30 a.m. Gopal left from Old Delhi Rail-
way Station for Bombay. Karkare left Frontier Hindu Hotel and
shifted to the Railway Station at Old Delhi,

6.19 On 22nd January 1948 Karkare was in Delhi and spent the
night in the waiting room at Delhi Railway Station. Next day, i.e.,
23rd, Karkare left Delhi for Mathura at 3-00 p.m. and stayed in
Mohan Gujarat Hotel as V. M. Vyas. Next day at 4-00 p.m. Karkare

i went to Agra by bus and left Agra Cantt. for Itarsi by Madras Ex-
press at 8*30 p.m.

6.20 On 25th January, Karkare took the Allahabad Express and
went to Kalyan and from there to Thana and stayed with G. M.
Joshi. On the 26th January he and Gopal met Apte and Godse at
the Thana Railway Station at 9*30 p.m. and that night Apte, Godse
and Karkare met at Thana Railway Station and took decisions about
Delhi. Apte paid three hundred rupees to Karkare for expenses.

6.21 On 27th January, 1948, Karkare had his morning meals with
Joshi. At 12 • 30 p.m. he left Thana for Dadar and posted some letters
at L. J. Road Mahim, At 3-00 p.m. Karkare bought his ticket at the
Bombay Central Railway Station for Delhi and left Bombay by
Frontier Mail at 5-45 p.m. reaching Delhi at 8-30 p.m. on 28th. He
stayed in the retiring room. '

6.22 On 29th January, Karkare went to Birla Dharmshala and
kept his bedding there where' Godse and Apte met him. At 1*00 p.m,
Apte, Godse and Karkare went to Old Delhi Railway Station and
6—259 HA.

stayed at retiring room No. 6. At 4-00 p.m. Karkare went to Birla
House with Apte and Godse where about 400 persons had collected.
They then returned to Old Delhi Railway Station,

6.23 On the 30th, after breakfast at the railway station restau-
rant, Apte, Karkare and Godse went to Birla Mandir and Godse
practised shooting in the jungle behind. At 11-30 a.m. Karkare
went to Madras Hotel and met Apte and Godse at the Delhi Railway
Station retiring room at 2-00 p.m. At 3-30 p.m. Apte, Godse and
Karkare left New Delhi Railway Station and went to Birla Mandir
and from there Apte and Karkare went to Birla House and, as
already stated, Godse shot at Mahatma Gandhi. Apte and Karkare
then fled to the Old Delhi Railway Station at 6-00 p.m. and stayed
the night on the platform along with the refugees.

6.24 On 31st January 1948, both Apte and Karkare left Delh.
Railway Station for Itarsi and there Karkare got the Allahabad Ex-
press and reached Kalyan on 2nd February, 1948, and then went to
stay at Sea Green Hotel at Bombay. On 4th February 1948 he and
Apte met Joshi and on the 5th February they went to stay with him. '
On the 7th February also he was with Joshi. On 9th February 1948
he went to Poona reaching there in the morning of 10th February.
On that day he slept at the platform among the refugees. On 11th
February he went to Dhond by Madras Express and returned to
Poena at 9-30 p.m. and went to Lonavala and from there to Thana.
He met Joshi on the 13th February and then stayed at the Apollo
Hotel. He was arrested from there on 14th February, 1948.

Gopal Godse

6.25 On the 14th Jaxuiary, 1948, Nathuram gave him two hundred
rupees to get a revolver and at the instance of his brother, Gopal
left Bombay and went by Punjab Mail to Delhi reaching there on
the 18th January and slept at the platform at night. Next morning
he went to Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan and met Karkare, Nathuram
Godse and Apte and then went to Birla House to survey the sur-
roundings. Thereafter he went to Hindu Mahasabha Bhawan.

6.26 After the explosion on the 20th he stayed at the Frontier
Hotel and left it on the 21st January and left Delhi at 9-30 a.m.
and reached Bombay at 11-00 a.m. on the 22nd and from there went
to Kirkee reaching there at 5-00 p.m. On 24th January Apte went
to see him to inquire about the revolver and also asked him to
accompany him to Bombay. On 25th January Gopal gave Nathuram
a revolver and then went to Thana at Joshi's p]ace where he met
Karkare and then returned to Poona.

Badge j

6.27 Badge's movements might also be given. He reached Delhi
at 10 -DO p.m. on 19th January, 1948 and went to the Hindu Maha-
sabha office where he met Madanlal and GopaL Later, Apte, Karkare
and Godse came to see him.

1

0.28 On 20th January he went to Birla House for surveying
l«, etc., and then'returned to the Hindu Mahasabha office
.Id |.m he again went to Birla House with others and after

the
At
the
the
and

explosion he fled from there and with Shankar caught
in war Express at 10-00 p.m. at the Delhi Railway Station
■hwl Kalyan on 22nd January and from there proceeded to Poona
vim' there at 4-00 p.m. He went for Devi yatra m the jungles of
na on the 30th and returned to Poona on the 31st when he was
■ted. ' '

0.29 It is not necessary to set out Shankar's movements
|)o Is stated to have been with Badge.

because

£^W33§ b m^mmsDicTwx of the commbsshw

ihdex of Paragraphs
2.3 Sambasivam Case (PC.) and Supreme .Court's case.
7,9 Mr. Justice Bhandari's findings.

X13 Res Judicata.

?,16 Christie^ and Timothy's cases.

.?} si-it **g *>>-/;.-. iai?.

CHAPTER VII
Jurisdiction of the Commission

7.1 The main objection to the jurisdiction of the Commission to
make an Inquiry into the conduct of the police, i.e., its shortcomings,
its inaction or its acts of commission or omission, its negligence in
the matter of investigation of the bomb case, was raised in an ap-
plication by Mr. J. D. Nagarvala, wit. 83. His main contention
against the jurisdiction of this Commission was based on the ground
that after the strictures passed by the learned trial judge, Judge
Atma Charan, the High Court came to a different conclusion; and
that once a court or a competent tribunal has come to the conclusion
on a point in controversy in a criminal matter that becomes res
judicata and cannot be reopened and the decision is binding and
conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the
ftd judication.

7.2 Although no judgment was relied upon, the law on the sub-
ject is well settled; i.e., if in a criminal court a verdict is given on
a matter which is in controversy, then the matter must be treated
as res judicata and cannot be reopened by any court or tribunal.

7.3 The matter was so decided by the Privy Council in Sambasi-
vam v. Public Prosecutor, Federal of Malaya 1 , and the Supreme
Court of India stated the law under section 403 of the Criminal
Procedure Code in terms similar to that stated by the Privy Council
in Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab 2 . In Sambasivam v. Public
Prosecutor the Privy Council laid down the following proposition: —

"The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a com-
petent court on a lawful charge and after a lawful trial
is not completely stated by saying that the person acquit-
ted cannot be tried again for the same offence. To that
it must be added that the verdict is binding and conclu-
sive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties
to the adjudication.
The maxim 'res judicata pro veritate accipitur' is no less ap-
plicable to criminal than to civil proceedings. Here, the
appellant having been acquitted at the first trial on the
charge of having ammunition in his possession, the pro-
secution was bound to accept the correctness of that ver-
dict and was precluded from taking any steps to challenge
it at the second trial."
Therefore, it was contended that if in the Gandhi Murder Cose,
which comprised the offence of bomb throwing, attempt to murder,
and murder, the conduct of the police or the quality of their inves-
tigation of the Bomb Case, i.e., whether they investigated any par-

1. (1950) A.C. 548.

2. (1956) A. SC. 415.

87